University of Dayton Law Review
Volume 8
Number 3 Symposium: Judicial Review and the
Constitution — The Text and Beyond

Article 12

1982

Judicial Review in the Name of the Constitution
Richard B. Saphire
University of Dayton

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Saphire, Richard B. (1982) "Judicial Review in the Name of the Constitution," University of Dayton Law
Review: Vol. 8: No. 3, Article 12.
Available at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol8/iss3/12

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at eCommons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in University of Dayton Law Review by an authorized editor of eCommons. For more
information, please contact mschlangen1@udayton.edu, ecommons@udayton.edu.

Judicial Review in the Name of the Constitution
Cover Page Footnote
Work on this article was supported, in part, by a grant from the University of Dayton. I would like to
express my appreciation to Bernard J. Dushman and Ira Mickenberg for their thoughtful comments on
earlier drafts.

This symposium is available in University of Dayton Law Review: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol8/iss3/12

JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE NAME OF THE
CONSTITUTION
Richard B. Saphire*
To stress the element of choice in constitutional interpretation is not
to argue that contemporary discretion is unlimited, but only that the limits are not those imposed by the language and pre-adoption history of the
Constitution. The limits, so far as they exist, are those that have developed over time in the ongoing process of valuation that occurs in the
name of the Constitution.'
What words does a candid noninterpretivist justice use in striking
down governmental action? Should the justice say that it violates the
Constitution-the equal protection clause, say-even though the stricken
action offends no value judgment fairly attributable to the framers?
Surely there is no harm in maintaining the linguistic convention of saying that the action violates the Constitution, so long as the justice is
candidly clear that by that he or she means not that the action offends
the original understanding of the clause, but that it contravenes the
Court's developing equal protection doctrine, which is itself not explicable in terms of any value judgment constitutionalized by the framers.'
It will, I suppose, surprise no one that when the Supreme Court
(or indeed any court) has before it cases "arising under [the] Constitution,"3 the Court supposes that its responsibility is to interpret the Constitution and professes to act in a manner consistent with that supposition. Indeed, the notion that a judge might even consciously entertain
the idea of ignoring the Constitution-or worse, of flouting it-might
seem somewhat strange, if not preposterous, to most persons unfamiliar
with the literature of contemporary constitutional theory. How, then,
can we account for the assertions of some prominent constitutional
scholars that, in various contexts, the Constitution has become "irrelevant" to the development of constitutional doctrine," or that much of
the Court's modern work product-particularly in the areas of privacy,
abortion, and race relations--cannot plausibly be "inferable from the
language of the Constitution, the framers' thinking respecting the spe-

* Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law. Work on this article was supported,
in part, by a grant from the University of Dayton. I would like to express my appreciation to
Bernard J. Dushman and Ira Mickenberg for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts.
I. Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation. 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1054 (1981).
2. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 143 n.0 (1982).
3. U.S. CONsT. art. I!I, § 2.
4. Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The First Amendment's Freedom of
Speech and Freedom of Press Clauses, 29 DRAKE L. REV. I (1979).
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cific problem in issue, any general value derivable from the provisions
they included, or the nation's governmental structure"?'
Understanding and evaluation of these assertions is advanced by
analyzing two major developments in contemporary constitutional theory. First, at a conceptual level, we have witnessed the polarization of
constitutional theory into two camps: interpretivism and noninterpretivism.' Second, at a methodological level, we have seen the development
of a rigorous scholarly debate with respect to the appropriate role of
the framers' intent in constitutional interpretation. One group of scholars has insisted that constitutional interpretation must rigidly comport
with the framers' intent. Another group of scholars has begun to question both the dispositiveness of the framers' intent and, indeed, whether
7
the very idea of the framers' intent is even coherent or intelligible.
In general, interpretivists tend to advocate strict adherence to constitutional values as perceived by the framers. Noninterpretivists may
respond in several ways. First, they may argue that the framers' intent
is much more general or open-ended than interpretivists suppose and
that constitutional provisions, such as the first or fourteenth amendments, yield more protection for individual rights than interpretivists
admit.8 Second, noninterpretivists may contend that even if the interpretivists' historical conclusions are conceded, the framers' intent
should not dispose of contemporary interpretations of at least some
constitutional provisions. Courts, they may claim, act legitimately even
where their decisions cannot plausibly be harmonized with the framers'
values: courts may give effect to values which derive from other
sources.9 Noninterpretivists taking this position may do so without conceding that this form of judicial review requires any special defense.
They may argue noninterpretive review is fully consistent with a defen5.
(1973).

Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 935-36

6. For analysis and evaluation of these two approaches to constitutional theory, see infra
notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
7. For analysis and evaluation of these views, see infra notes 107-24 and accompanying text.
8. It is not clear whether these arguments can fairly be understood as noninterpretive. The
major point of contention would not be whether the original understandings should be considered
dispositive, but what those understandings were. However, interpretivists may be so convinced of
their historical conclusions that any other historical interpretation may be deemed noninterpretive.
Compare Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399
(1978) with Berger, Government by Judiciary:John Hart Ely's "Invitation," 54 IND. L.J. 277.

(1979).
9. For prominent discussions of the role that "fundamental values," not obviously derivable
from the framers' intent, can play in constitutional interpretation, see Brest, The Fundamental
Constitutional Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictionsof Normative Scholarship, 90
YALE L.J. 1063 (1981); Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term-Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values. 92 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1978); Lupu; Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 77 MicH. L. REV. 981 (1979).
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sible conception of democratic theory and that it is fully compatible
with a legitimate, if not inevitable, judicial role.1 0
A third noninterpretivist response to the interpretivist position is
best exemplified by the work of Professor Michael J. Perry. In his recent book," Perry argues that judicial review can be defended as legitimate even where the Court's decisions "reflect not value judgments, or
interpretations or applications of value judgments made and embodied
in the Constitution by the framers, but value judgments made and enforced by the Court against other, electorally accountable branches of
government."'" Perry argues that "virtually all modern constitutional
cases of consequence," and particularly those involving individual or
human rights, "cannot plausibly be explained except in terms of
noninterpretive review, because in virtually no such case can it plausibly be maintained that the framers constitutionalized the determinative
value judgment."' 3 Since noninterpretive review and the results it produces cannot be reconciled with the framers' intent, such review, for
Perry, constitutes policymaking by an electorally unaccountable body
(viz. the Supreme Court) and, as such, is presumptively undemocratic.
In order to rebut this presumption, Perry applies his considerable energy and talent to establish a functional justification for noninterpretive
review. Perry states:
There is no plausible textual or historical justification for constitutional policymaking by the judiciary-no way to avoid the conclusion
that noninterpretive review, whether of state or federal action, cannot be
justified by reference either to the text or to the intentions of the framers
of the Constitution. The justification for the practice, if there is one,
must be functional: If noninterpretive review serves a crucial governmental function that no other practice realistically can be expected to serve,
and if it serves that function in a manner that somehow accommodates
the principle of electorally accountable policymaking, then that function
constitutes the justification for noninterpretive review. 4
Ultimately, Perry argues that the Supreme Court does indeed
serve a crucial and unique function in our system of government."

10. See, e.g.. Bishin, Judicial Review in Democratic Theory. 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1099
(1977); Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703 (1980).
11. M. PERRY, supra note 2.
12. Id. at 2.
13. Id. at I I (footnote omitted).
14. Id. at 24.
15. The complete elaboration of Perry's functional justification is set out in Chapter 4 of his
book. This chapter was, with slight modification, previously published in Perry, Noninterpretive
Review in Human Rights Cases: A Functional Justification, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 278 (1981). For
an earlier treatment by Perry of the functional justification, see Perry, The Abortion Funding
Cases: A Comment on the Supreme Court's Role in American Government. 66 G EO. L.J. 1191,
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That function is a "prophetic one": "it is to call the American people-actually the government, the representatives of the people-to
provisional judgment.""' Noninterpretive review is "a way of remedying what would otherwise be a serious defect in American government-the absence of any policymaking institution that regularly deals
with fundamental political-moral problems other than by mechanical
reference to established moral conventions." 7 Moreover, it has "enabled us to maintain a tolerable accommodation between, first, our democratic commitment and, second, the possibility that there may indeed
be right answers-discoverable right answers-to fundamental political-moral problems."'"
A major difference between Perry's approach and that of other
noninterpretivists is his emphatic agreement with the interpretivists'
contention that noninterpretive review is presumptively undemocratic
and thus in need of special justification.1 9 Although Perry claims that
noninterpretive review does in fact serve a unique and salutary function, he recognizes that this alone will not establish its legitimacy. Its
legitimacy depends upon whether the tension between noninterpretive
review and the "axiomatic" principle of electorally accountable policymaking20 can be reconciled. For Perry, that tension can be reconciled
by a recognition that Congress, which is an electorally accountable
policymaking institution, has plenary power to regulate and limit the
jurisdiction of federal courts in those areas where the courts have engaged in noninterpretive review.2 " Perry argues, albeit reluctantly,"1
that the jurisdiction-limiting power is "a proper vehicle for electorally
accountable policymakers to control the value judgments, not of past
framers, but of electorally unaccountable judges."' 8

1201-19 (1978).
16. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 99.

17. Id. at 101 (emphasis in original). Perry continues: "Such review is an enterprise
designed to enable the American polity to live out its commitment to an ever-deepening moral
understanding and to political practices that harmonize with that understanding." Id.
18. Id. at 102 (emphasis in original).
19.

Other noninterpretivists may agree with Perry that the Court performs an essential

function in human rights cases but conclude that the Court's unique ability to perform that function is, in itself, a sufficient basis to justify its apparently antidemocratic implications. See, e.g., J.
CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 60-79 (1980).

20. "In our political culture, the principal of electorally accountable policymaking is axiomatic; it is judicial review, not that principle, that requires justification." M. PERRY, supra note 2,.
at 9 (footnotes omitted).
21. For Perry's discussion of congressional power to control federal jurisdiction and its implications for the legitimacy of noninterpretive review, see id. at 128-38.
22. "1 am not happy conceding such a broad jurisdiction-limiting power to Congress." Id. at
137.
23. Id. at 132 n.t. Other noninterpretivists have argued vigorously that Congress does not

have the plenary power to control jurisdiction---even with respect to noninterpretive review--that
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Perry's reliance upon the jurisdiction-limiting power of Congress
to justify noninterpretive review is surely destined to become one of the
most controversial aspects of his theory. Although he does not believe
that the power would or should be exercised frequently, he is prepared
to accept that possibility; as a matter of principle, he believes that a
noninterpretive theorist has no choice. 4 Others, no doubt, will contend
that this concession is both an unacceptable and unnecessary price to
2
pay.
Thus, the question arises whether Perry's conception of noninterpretivism, and his concomitant concession concerning congressional
power to control jurisdiction, represents, as he claims, the only plausible basis for defending contemporary human rights decisions by the
Supreme Court. Near the end of his fourth chapter, Perry extends an
invitation to others who share his general-commitment to judicial activ-

Perry supposes. See, e.g.. Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword: Constitutional
Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 17 (1981); Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored Rights Out of the
Federal Courts, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 129 (1981). For the view of a dogmatic interpretivist that Congress has broad power to limit jurisdiction, and that we "should welcome the exercise of congressional power to restore the democratic system of self-government," see Berger,
Commentary: Congressional Contraction of Federal Jurisdiction, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 801, 810.
24. "But I do not see how anyone who is interested in justifying noninterpretive review, and
who takes seriously the principle of electorally accountable policymaking, can avoid making that
concession." M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 137 (emphasis in original). Perry also recognizes the
possibility that noninterpretive review may produce decisions which he and other noninterpretivist
theorists consider morally illegitimate. In such an event, and especially where Congress does not
counteract such decisions by limiting the Court's jurisdiction, the theorists may exercise "the option of becoming, with [Judge Robert] Bork, a defender of interpretivism instead." Id. at 119. On
the other hand, the frequent invocation of the jurisdiction-limiting power raises serious questions
concerning the Court's ability to perform its crucial and unique function. Perry's critics will, no
doubt, argue that this is a very shaky foundation upon which to build a theory of judicial review.
25. Perry's claim that it is essential to recognize an unlimited congressional power to control
jurisdiction in order to reconcile noninterpretive review with established notions of democracy is
certainly not free from controversy. For example, in a recent television debate on contemporary
proposals to restrict the Court's jurisdiction in the abortion area in response to Roe v. Wade,
Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania refuted the arguments of Senator John East of North
Carolina that recognition of the power to respond to controversial decisions like Roe through jurisdictional regulation was essential in a democratic society. Here is part of Specter's response:
I think in the long run it does not, because the basic issue here is constitutional government, and I would disagree with your introduction, if I might, when you talked about
liberals and conservatives. From a basic point of view, there are many of us who are trying
to conserve the Supreme Court as the final decider of important national questions. And
even though we may disagree with specific Supreme Court decisions, there are many of us
who are dedicated to upholding the supremacy of the Supreme Court because, in the long
run, the Supreme Court has been an institution which has provided for the national welfare. It made us one nation with a set of values which have been very important.
Transcript of "The MacNeil-Lehrer Report," Public Broadcasting System 3 (Aug. 17, 1982)(remarks of Senator Specter)(on file with the University of Dayton Law Review). Senator Specter
further remarked that "when it is an interpretation of the due-process clause, or a constitutional
issue, that is really an area which many of us believe to be pretty much sacrosanct." Id. at 4.
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ism to elaborate an alternative approach to constitutional interpretation
which would not require the concessions he makes." I wish to at least
begin such a task in this article. In the first section, I will briefly trace
the two recent developments in constitutional theory to which I previously referred: the formulation of the distinction between interpretivism
and noninterpretivism, and the renewal of interest in the framers' intent. I then return to Professor Perry's conception of the framers' intent
and the role it plays in constitutional interpretation, with particular
emphasis upon his distinction between "contraconstitutional" and "extraconstitutional" decisionmaking. In Section II, I offer some preliminary criticism of this distinction, questioning both its coherence and its
utility for constitutional theory. In Section III, I will undertake a reconsideration of the appropriate role of the framers' intent in constitutional interpretation. After exploring some of the reasons why the
framers' intent has been so central to constitutional interpretation, I
will question the coherence and intelligibility of the search for that intent. I argue that, at least as employed in the work of contemporary
interpretivists and by Professor Perry, the notion of a "framers' intent"
is an abstraction without objective substance-an artifact created to
satisfy a fundamental need for order and stability. As thus conceived,
the framers' intent constitutes a paradox for constitutional theory
which, when properly understood, requires a basic reorientation with
respect to its use in constitutional decisionmaking. Such a reorientation
should include an approach which views the framers' intent as a relevant, although not necessarily dispositive, element of constitutional interpretation. Although such an approach is inconsistent with the notion that the Constitution is a source of objective meanings prefigured
in the written text, it does not, I shall argue, commit one to the view
that constitutional interpretation collapses inevitably into a wholly subjective process in which judges are free to translate their purely personal preferences into constitutional doctrine.
I.

INTERPRETIVISM, NONINTERPRETIVISM, AND THE FRAMERS'
INTENT

Two recent pieces of constitutional scholarship have played especially important roles in reenergizing the debate between contemporary
theorists concerning the legitimacy and appropriate scope of judicial
review. The first is Thomas Grey's article entitled, Do We Have an
26. Perhaps I have overlooked something. Perhaps it is possible to justify noninterpretive
review in a way that takes seriously the principle of electorally accountable policymaking
but that does not concede a broad jurisdiction-limiting power to Congress. I invite anyone
interested in elaborating such a justification to try to do so.
M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 137.
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Unwritten Constitution?7 Grey expressed a proposition that was not

surprising to, or regarded as controversial by those who had more than
a passing familiarity with the performance of the modern Supreme
Court: "In the important cases, reference to and analysis of the consti-

tutional text plays a minor role. The dominant norms of decision are
those large conceptions of governmental structure and individual rights
that are at best referred to, and whose content is scarcely at all speci.",8
". What proved to be deeply
fied, in the written Constitution ..
controversial about Grey's thesis was its prescriptive aspect; he applauded this state of affairs. He argued that aside from interpreting the

written Constitution, the Court did and should perform the "additional
role as the expounder of basic national ideals of individual liberty and

fair treatment, even when the content of these ideals is not expressed as
a matter of positive law in the written Constitution."' 9
The important impact of Grey's article cannot be attributed exclusively, or even primarily, to its prescriptive message."0 Instead, the

seminal status of Grey's article is attributable to the analytical or
methodological device which he employed: the distinction between interpretivism and noninterpretivism. Grey identified two principal models which characterized constitutional scholarship. The first was the
"pure interpretive model" (interpretivism), according to which "the

only norms used in constitutional adjudication must be those inferable
from the text-that the Constitution must not be seen as licensing
courts to articulate and apply contemporary norms not demonstrably
expressed or implied by the framers.""1 The second model, which Grey
27. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975).
28. Id. at 707-08.
29. Id. at 706.
30. In addition to Grey's article on the unwritten constitution, see Grey, Procedural Fairness and Substantive Rights, in NoMos XVIII: DUE PROCESS 182 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman
eds. 1977); Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution. Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought. 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Grey, Origins). Grey has not
been without distinguished company. See, e.g.. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword:
The Forms of Justice. 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979); Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional
Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973); Perry,
Abortion. the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due
Process, 23 UCLA L. REV. 689 (1976); Richards, Human Rights as the Unwritten Constitution:
The Problem of Change and Stability in Constitutional Interpretation, 4 U. DAYTON L. REv. 295
(1979). See also C. BLACK, DECISIONS ACCORDING TO LAW (1981); R. DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); M. PERRY, supra note 2.
For general discussion and critiques of the works of the leading advocates of judicial activism,
see Brest, supra note 9; Grano, Judicial Review and a Written Constitution in a Democratic
Society. 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1981); Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution. 56 N.Y.U. L. REV.
353 (1981).
31. Grey, supra note 27, at 706 n.9.
Note that Grey included within the interpretivist model norms "inferable from the text" and
then went on to include norms which were "demonstrably expressed or implied by the framers."
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termed noninterpretive, expresses a "broader view of judicial review."
It regards as legitimate "[c]onstitutional adjudication going beyond the
norms implicit in text and original history.132 While noninterpretive review "does not deny that the Constitution is a written document, expressing some clear and positive restraints upon governmental
power," '3 3 it does not regard the written Constitution as the "exclusive
'3 4
legitimate source of judicially enforceable constitutional law."
The second recent work which has had an extraordinary impact on
the recent development of constitutional theory is Raoul Berger's book,
5
Government by Judiciary,"
published in 1977. Berger focused his inquiry on the records of the 39th Congress and the legislative history of
the fourteenth amendment. He concluded that the 39th Congress had
an extremely limited understanding of what the fourteenth amendment
could accomplish. The amendment, concluded Berger, was designed to
constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of 1866-and no more." It was
not intended to prohibit state laws denying Negro suffrage,3 7 malapportioned legislatures, 8 or segregated schools.3 9 Nor was it intended to
make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states.' 0 Berger argued that
neither the privileges or immunities, equal protection, nor due process
clauses were understood by the framers as empowering the Court to
substitute its policy choices for theirs."1 Berger's constitutional theory is
tightly connected to his interpretation of constitutional history: Since
the only justification for the Court's power lies in its responsibility to

Although "inferable from the text" and "implied by the framers" may be redundant (for example,
only those textually unexpressed norms which the framers themselves thought should be implied
from those which are expressed should be appropriate to constitutional adjudication) it need not
be. It is often suggested that norms which can plausibly be implied from the text can be employed
under the interpretivist model even when there is no evidence that the framers themselves would
have made the implication.
32. Id. at 714.
33. Id. at 706. "Nor," Grey goes on to say, "does it deny that part of the business of
judicial review consists of giving effect to these explicit commands." Id.
34. Grey, Origins, supra note 30, at 844 (emphasis in original).
Grey contended that unwritten constitutional norms were to be found in or derived from the
concept of higher, natural law principles to which he claimed the framers of the original Constitution were intellectually and philosophically committed. In his 1978 essay, he sought to provide
historical support for this view. See generally id. In his 1975 essay, he also claimed that "[slection
I of the 14th amendment is thus properly seen as a reaffirmation and reenactment in positive law
of the principle that fundamental human rights have constitutional status." Grey, supra note 27,
at 716.
35. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).
36. Id. at 23, 212-13.
37. Id. at 52-68.
38. Id. at 69-98.
39. Id. at 117-33.
40. Id. at 134-56.
41. Id. at 214.
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interpret the written Constitution, and since the framers' intent to give
the fourteenth amendment a limited and fixed meaning is "as good as
written into the text," ' judicial interpretations which accord to the
amendment a different meaning (e.g., broader or narrower) than that
which the framers gave it constitute an illegitimate usurpation of
majoritarian power.43
Berger's book stimulated an explosion of academic interest in the
framers' intent and its significance for constitutional adjudication. Indeed, responding to Berger's thesis has become somewhat of a cottage
industry in constitutional scholarship.44 (Issuing responses to his critics
has become somewhat of a cottage industry for Berger himself).45 Although some commentators have written approvingly of Berger's historical and theoretical conclusions,4e most of the commentary has been
quite critical. The criticisms have taken several different routes. One
approach has been to attempt a refutation of Berger's historical analysis and conclusions-what might be called trying to out-Berger Berger.
For example, Professor Dimond has argued that, in several respects,
Berger's reading of the legislative history of the fourteenth amendment
was unduly restrictive, selective, and exaggerated, and that notwithstanding Berger's assertions to the contrary,' 7 the evidence supports an
48
open-ended reading of the amendment.

42. Id. at 7 (footnote omitted).
43. In addition to contending that the framers intended to limit the substantive scope of the
fourteenth amendment, Berger also concluded that the framers did not intend to give the Court
power to revise their limited understandings. Indeed, he argued that the framers of the original
constitution (e.g., Elbridge Gerry and Alexander Hamilton) explicitly rejected the notion that the
Court should have such power. Id. at 393-96.
44. For partial listings of the literature spawned by Berger's book, see M. PERRY, supra
note 2, at 63 n.23; Dimond, Strict Construction and Judicial Review of Racial Discrimination
Under the Equal Protection Clause: Meeting Raoul Berger on Interpretivist Grounds, 80 MIcH.
L. REV. 462, 463 n.7 (1982).
45. See, e.g., Berger, Academe vs. The Founding Fathers. NAT'L REV. Apr. 14, 1978, at
468; Berger, supra note 8; Berger, The Scope of Judicial Review: An Ongoing Debate. 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 527 (1979); Berger, Ely's "Theory of Judicial Review," 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 87
(1981); Berger, Paul Brest's Brief For An Imperial Judiciary, 40 MD. L. REV. I (1981).
46. See. e.g., Bridwell, The Scope of JudicialReview: A Dirge for the Theorists of Majority Rule?, 31 S.C.L. REv. 617 (1980); Monaghan. The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 117 (1978).
47. See R. BERGER, supra note 35. at 99-116.
48. Professor Dimond concluded:
Although debate on section I was relatively meager and is subject to conflicting interpretations, the evidence that is there does not show that the privileges or immunities clause
was intended to have a precisely limited scope or that it incorporates only the rights enumerated in the 1866 Civil Rights Act. There is even less evidence that the framers intended
to restrict the equal protection clause to the terms of the Civil Rights Act, to the Black
Codes, or to "privileges or immunities," however they might be defined. In fact, the only
consistently mentioned limit on the amendment was that it did not give black citizens the
right to vote. Consistent with the text, the evils addressed, and John Bingham's drafting,
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A second tack taken by Berger's critics has been to accept the
bulk of his historical conclusions while rejecting the notion that, in

every case, the framers' intent ought to be binding. For example, Dean
Alfange has written that "[i]t must be conceded that many of Berger's
conclusions on specific historical points are not easily challengeable,"
and that Berger's "historical argument is very powerful."' Nevertheless, Alfange rejects Berger's view that the specific understanding of
the framers should be given eternally dispositive significance (until, of

course, the Constitution is appropriately amended)."
Several variants of this approach to the framers' intent have also

been developed. For example, in analyzing the Supreme Court's deci1 Alexander Bickel wrote that "it
sion in Brown v. Board of Education,"
is impossible to conclude that the 39th Congress intended that segregation be abolished; impossible also to conclude that they foresaw it
might be, under the language they were adopting."52' Nevertheless,
Bickel relied on the fact that the framers chose broad language for the
fourteenth amendment, and on the distinctions between the "broadly

the congressional debates suggest that section I-particularly the equal protection
clause-was framed in general terms and did not have a generally accepted and narrowly
limited meaning.
Dimond, supra note 44, at 501-02 (footnote omitted).
For another example of a critique which refutes Berger's historical conclusions, see Gibbons,
Book Review, 31 RUTGERS L. REv. 839 (1978). Judge Gibbons concluded that "Berger's treatment of the debates in the 39th Congress is a narrow, confused, partisan example of special pleading rather than an objective effort to discern the collective intention of the legislative body." Id. at
845. For Berger's response, see Berger, "Government by Judiciary": Judge Gibbons' Argument
Ad Hominem, 59 B.U.L. REv. 783 (1979). Professor Soifer has also claimed that Berger's book
"contains very poor history." "[Tlhe history [Berger] offers ...is misleading and frequently
internally inconsistent in the most crucial areas." Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of
Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651, 654, 655 (1979) (footnote omitted).
49. Alfange, On Judicial Policymaking and Constitutional Change: Another Look at the
"Original Intent" Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 603, 606,
607 (1978).
50. Dean Alfange does not argue that the framers' intent ought never be dispositive. For
example, he concedes that where a "desired change would be unmistakably contrary to an unambiguous provision of the Constitution, there is no doubt that the only legitimate mode of accomplishing it would be by formal amendment." Id. at 619. Where the constitutional provision in
question is couched in general and ambiguous language, however, Alfange suggests that "[a]s
generations pass, the precise end that the framers of a constitution sought to achieve may no
longer be relevant, and it may be far more desirable and sensible for courts to ignore outmoded
intentions and instead concern themselves with accommodating the spirit and general goals of the
provisions under consideration." Id. at 610.
51. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
52. Memorandum from Alexander Bickel to Justice Frankfurter, quoted in R. KLUGER,
SIMPLE JUSTICE 654 (1975). See also A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962) ("Was
it the intention of the framers. . .to forbid the state to enact and enforce segregation statutes? If
one goes to the historical materials with this specific question, the only answer that can emerge is
in the negative. The framers did not intend or expect then and there to outlaw segregation, which,
of course, was a practice widely prevalent in the North." Id. at 100).
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worded organic" nature of the Constitution and the more limited purposes of a statute, 8 to conclude that the Court's decision in Brown
could be reconciled with the original understanding. Similarly, Ronald
Dworkin has developed a distinction between the framers' concepts and
their conceptions." The framers' concepts represent broad moral views,
such as fairness or equality. Their conceptions were the particular interpretations or applications which they gave to these moral standards. 5 Dworkin argues that the broad language the framers chose for
such provisions as the eighth and fourteenth amendments suggests they
intended that those provisions embody concepts, not conceptions, and
that it would therefore be a "mistake for the Court to be much influenced" by their particular conceptions."
A third form of response to Berger's thesis is exemplified by

Michael Perry, who wrote:
Berger demonstrates about as clearly as one can, I think, that the
framers specifically intended that the fourteenth amendment would not
diminish any state's plenary control over suffrage, and that they did not
intend that the amendment would diminish any state's plenary control
over education or judicial proceedings, or make applicable to the states
the Bill of Rights. In so demonstrating, Berger effectively destroys
whatever might have remained of the notion that modern constitutional
cases involving legislative reapportionment, school desegregation, criminal procedure, or first amendment issues are somehow rooted (however
tenuously) in the original understanding-or even the "spirit"-of the
fourteenth amendment. The results in these cases are in fact either contrary to the original understanding (as in the7 case of the reapportionment decisions) or wholly unsupported by it.5

53. Bickel, The Original Understandingand the SegregationDecision, 69 HARV. L. REv. I,
59 (1966). Bickel concluded that it was "an awareness on the part of these framers that it was a
constitution they were writing, which led to a choice of language capable of growth." Id. at 63
(emphasis in original).
54. R. DwORKIN, supra note 30, at 134-37.
55. The difference is a difference not just in the detail of the instructions given but in
the kind of instructions given. When I appeal to the concept of fairness I appeal to what
fairness means, and I give my views on that issue no special standing. When I lay down a
conception of fairness, I lay down what I mean by fairness, and my view is therefore the
heart of the matter. When I appeal to fairness I pose a moral issue; when I lay down my
conception of fairness I try to answer it.
Id. at 135 (emphasis in original).
56. Id. Professors Richards and O'Fallon have also relied upon the concept-conception distinction. See O'Fallon, Adjudication and Contested Concepts: The Case of Equal Protection.54
N.Y.U. L. REV. 19 (1979); Richards, supra note 30, at 295. For a critique of the distinction, see
Saphire, Professor Richards' Unwritten Constitution of Human Rights: Some PreliminaryObservations. 4 U. DAYTON L. REv. 305 (1979). See also Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REv. 797, 821-25 (1982).
57. Perry, Book Review, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 685, 687-88 (1978)(citations and footnote

omitted).
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Perry claims that "Berger's historical conclusions seem . . .compel-

ling,"" and that "Berger has used-interpreted-that [historical] information more reasonably than most others."" Although persuaded
by Berger's history, Perry rejects "his political theory-summed up in
his belief about the determinative significance of the original understanding," which Perry regards as "simplistic." 6 Perry concludes that
it is time for constitutional theorists to stop playing games with the
original understanding of the fourteenth amendment, to stop searching
for justifications of the Court's modern decisions in terms of the framers' intent." Instead, theorists should seek justification for judicial activism in a constitutional theory which would "have the Court continue
to answer 'fourteenth amendment' questions by reference to traditional

and emergent societal ideals" 62 and which can be defended as consistent with our societal commitment to majoritarian policymaking..
Perry's conception of the framers' intent and its appropriate role in
constitutional interpretation is central to his definition of noninterpretivism and his strategy for justifying that mode of judicial review. A
fuller exploration of this conception is helpful in evaluating Perry's theory.' 8 Initially, Perry argues that "the particular configuration of words

58. Id. at 688. More recently, Perry has characterized Berger's reconstruction of the framers' intent as "substantially compelling," and his "conclusions concerning the original understanding of section one of the fourteenth amendment" as "generally sound." M. PERRY, supra note 2,
at 62, 63. Perry concludes that the meticulousness of Berger's historical analysis is an important
reason to regard his history as compelling: "he [Berger] does not merely announce conclusions,
but marshals the evidence (statements by the framers) for the reader, without ignoring conflicting
evidence." Perry, supra note 30, at 688.
Perry's observations sharply oppose those of other leading commentators. For example. Walter Murphy criticized what he perceived as Berger's selective parsing of the legislative history and
concluded that "Berger's style of reasoning is often that of the clever college debater rather than
that of the careful scholar." Murphy, Constitutional Interpretation:t The Art of the Historian.
Magician, or Statesman? (Book Review), 87 YALE L.J. 1752, 1756 (1978). Murphy accused Berger of either ignoring or discounting evidence which would have put many of his conclusions into
doubt. Id. at 1757.
59. Perry, supra note 57, at 691.
60. Id. Perry aligned himself with Laurence Tribe in rejecting Berger's view that the original understanding is determinative. Id. at 695. He expressed the "guess (hope?) . . .that most
constitutional theorists will forsake the belief that the Court should be faithful to the original
understanding." Id. at 704.
61. Recently Perry has written that constitutional theorists should not "romanticize the
framers' political-moral consciousness," M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 73 n.*. Perry prefers "to let
the framers sleep. Just as the framers, in their day, judged by their lights, so must we, in our day,
judge by ours." Id. at 75.
62. Perry, supra note 57, at 704.
63. In this article, my analysis of Perry's theory will focus almost exclusively on his conception of the role of the framers' intent in constitutional interpretation. As suggested by the other
contributions to this Symposium, Perry's theory, taken as a whole, is as provocative and enlightening as it is controversial. It will, in my judgment, rank as one of the most important works in
constitutional theory of this generation. Elsewhere, I have commented more generally on Perry's
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the framers used in drafting a constitutional provision" has less priority
for constitutional interpretation than "the value judgments the framers
meant to embody in those words."'6 4 The preeminent task is
"[a]scertaining the precise character of the framers' value judgments,"
a task which "often requires reference to historical materials that disclose the framers' intentions."61 5 Perry rejects the notion that "the judiciary should invalidate only political practices that were present to the
minds of the framers and [which] the framers meant to ban." 6 Even
interpretivists concede, Perry notes, that practices which are clearly
analogous to those the framers meant to ban legitimately may be subject to judicial invalidation. Thus, the important questions courts must
address include: (1) what practices, present to the framers' minds, did
they intend or expect a particular provision to prohibit?; and (2) what
contemporary practices are sufficiently analogous to those which the
framers intended to ban so that they may be deemed the equivalent of
the latter? For Perry, judicial invalidation of governmental practices
which fall within either of these categories represents interpretive review and presents no significant problem for constitutional theory.
Obviously, this analysis poses some threshold factual questions. If
a challenged governmental practice is (1) not one which was "present
to the minds of the framers," and which the framers meant to ban, or
(2) is not (sufficiently) analogous to such a practice, judicial invalidation of the practice would not be mandated by the relevant value judgment constitutionalized by the framers. If invalidation of such a practice is not mandated by the applicable provision, can it be reconciled
with that provision; that is, can it be claimed that by invalidating the
practice, the Court has not acted inconsistently with the Constitution?
An understanding of Perry's answer depends upon an appreciation of
the distinction he draws between extraconstitutional and contraconstitutional decisions.
Perry defines a contraconstitutional decision (or practice) as one
which is contrary to a value judgment constitutionalized by the framers: "A contraconstitutional decision would be one that decreed a result
contrary to a state of affairs that is constitutionally required---or a result reached in the exercise of a mode of judicial review the framers
An extraconstitutional decision (or practice)
intended to foreclose." '
is one which goes "beyond any value judgment the framers constitu-

work. See Saphire, Making Noninterpretivism Respectable: The Contributions of Michael J.
Perry to Constitutional Theory (Book Review), 81 MIcH. L. REV. 101 (1983).
64. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 32 (footnote omitted).
65. Id. (footnote omitted).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 74.
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but is not contrary to that judgment. In both situations,

the decision could not be said to be mandated by the framers' value

judgment. That is, it could not derive affirmative support or justification in terms of that value judgment. A contraconstitutional decision
would fly in the face of the framers' value judgment; instead of claiming to be a decision in the name of the Constitution, it would be a
decision against the Constitution. By contrast, an extraconstitutional

decision, although unable to claim affirmative support from the Constitution, could not properly be understood as being against the Constitution. The most that could be said against an extraconstitutional decision is, first, that the framers did not contemplate the governmental
practice in question and thus could not be understood to have either

prohibited or permitted it, or, second, that the framers did contemplate
the practice and they intended the constitutional clause in question to
69
not prohibit it.
For Perry, contraconstitutional decisions would present the most
extreme problems of legitimacy. Although he once suggested that such

decisions could not plausibly be defended, 70 in his book he explicitly
reserves judgment on the issue.71 Extraconstitutional decisionmaking

can, however, be justified; but not in (the traditional noninterpretivist)
terms of its constitutional pedigree. That is, noninterpretive review
which is, in terms of its practice and results, extraconstitutional cannot
be justified by resort to constitutional text, history or structure, and
thus cannot be understood properly as constitutional interpretation.It

is policymaking, and can only be defended (if at all) in functional
terms.
In section III, I will argue against the conception of the framers'

68. Id. at 20 n.0.
69. Id. at 74.
70. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal. 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 1023, 1032 n.47 (1979) ("(Of course, to say that the Court's decision in Brown was not
contraconstitut ional is not to justify the decision (although to say that it was contraconstitutional
would certainly be to condemn it).").
71. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at ix. In an article completed since the publication of his book,
Perry refers to the problem of justifying extraconstitutional policymaking as one of democratic
theory which "might engage any society, even one without a written constitution." Perry, Equal
Protection, Judicial Activism, and the Intellectual Agenda of Constitutional Theory: Reflections
On. and Beyond, Plyler v. Doe, U. Pr. L. REV. (1983). The legitimacy of contraconstitutional policymaking by the judiciary is, however, "a different sort of issue. There the problem is.
not the legitimacy, as a matter of democratic theory, of an activist but politically unaccountable
judiciary, but, instead, the legitimacy of any governmental institution, including the judiciary,
acting contrary to (some aspect of) the written fundamental law, understood as norms constitutionalized by the framers." Id. at _. Perry goes on to note that a "plausible case" can be made
that extraconstitutional policymaking by the federal judiciary against the states may itself be a
contraconstitutional practice in light of the tenth amendment-an issue which he considers as
"one regarding the matter of obligation of fidelity to law." Id. at _.
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intent which underlies Perry's theory and that noninterpretive review
can indeed be plausibly understood as constitutional interpretation.
Before doing so, however, I would like briefly to suggest some problematic aspects of Perry's distinction between contraconstitutional and extraconstitutional decisionmaking.

II.

SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE

CONTRACONSTITUTIONAL/EXTRACONSTITUTIONAL

DISTINCTION

Perry addresses the contraconstitutional problem only briefly. He
refers to only one case, Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell,7 21 which might even plausibly be deemed contraconstitutional.73
Indeed, in the book's preface, he claims that "virtually no modern constitutional policymaking by the judiciary, in particular the Supreme
Court, is contraconstitutional. ' 4 Put differently, Perry's claim is that it
is implausible to believe that any modern Supreme Court decision
(with the possible exception of Blaisdell) is contrary to a value judgresult conment constitutionalized by the framers in that it decrees "a 75
required.1
constitutionally
is
that
affairs
of
state
a
trary to
But what does Perry mean by "constitutionally required"? He addresses this issue in the context of a discussion of Brown v. Board of
Education.7 6 Brown, he claims, cannot be justified in terms of the
framers' intent because (given his interpretation of the original understanding of the fourteenth amendment) the framers did not intend to
prohibit school segregation." However, Perry claims, the framers did
not intend to require public school segregation.7 8 Thus, although the
framers were aware of the existence of segregated schools, and although Perry believes they approved of the practice, Brown cannot
fairly be interpreted as contradicting their intent with respect to the
equal protection clause because they did not require segregation. No
matter that they saw no need to require segregation because they could
not envision the possibility that society as they conceived it would embrace integration or that courts might even permit it. If they wanted to
72. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
73. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 20 n.*. In his review of Berger's historical examination of
the fourteenth amendment, Perry agreed with Berger that "the framers specifically intended that
the fourteenth amendment would not diminish any state's plenary control over suffrage," Perry,
supra note 57, at 687, and that the reapportionment decisions of the Warren Court were "either
contrary to the original understanding . . .or wholly unsupported by it." Id. at 688. If, indeed,
those cases were contrary to the framers' value judgment, they must also have been
contraconstitutional.
74. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at ix (footnote omitted).
75. Id. at 74.
76. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
77. See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 66-67. See also R. BERGER, supra note 35, at 117-33.
78. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 74.
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ensure that subsequent courts or other governmental instrumentalities
could not lawfully prohibit segregation-at least in the absence of a
subsequent constitutional amendment-they were, obliged, under
Perry's theory, to include a provision in the Constitution explicitly stating that as long as states decide to have public schools those schools
must be segregated. At the very least, the framers should have provided
an unequivocal expression of that intent in the legislative history. Having failed to meet either of these requirements, the framers must be
understood to have reconciled themselves to the possibility that subsequent constitutional interpreters would be free to prohibit segregation-a prohibition which would be deemed beyond but not contrary to
their intent.79
Perry's analysis is troubling in several respects. First, it makes a
distinction between a decision to require and a decision to prohibit a
state of affairs which seems of dubious logic. Perhaps a hypothetical
problem will help illustrate this point. Assume that Jones wishes to give
instructions to his children concerning the way they are to treat their
friends at school, and that he intends, and has a right to expect, that
they will follow his instructions precisely. Assume further that Jones'
children go to a school that is segregated (e.g., it excludes blacks) or
that is completely white as a result of "natural" demographic and geographic factors. Moreover, assume that Jones' children know that he
regards blacks as inferior and that he has preached this philosophy at
home. Jones decides to give the following instruction: "You are to treat
your classmates with the same dignity and respect that you would expect them to accord you." If, at some future time, a black child is
permitted to attend the children's school, how might Jones' children
interpret his instruction when considering what treatment to accord
her? They might approach this matter in the following way: "Father
told us to accord all of our classmates the same dignity and respect we
would expect for ourselves. But he did not mention specifically how he
expected us to treat a black classmate. Since he did not, we must decide whether (1) he intended us to treat this black student with the
same dignity and respect as any other student; (2) he intended us to
exercise our own judgment on the matter; or (3) he intended to prohibit
us from treating the black student with dignity and respect." Which of
these inferences would be most consistent with Jones' instructions?

•79. If the framers did indeed intend to require segregation, a decision by a nonjudicial governmental entity-say, a school board-to prohibit segregation would also be contraconstitutional
and thus, according to Perry, justifiable (if at all) only according to a political or moral theory
which conceded authority to violate the law. On the other hand, if the school board's decision were
viewed as extraconstitutional, it would, given the democratic characteristics of the board's decisionmaking processes, be presumptively legitimate.
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This question, of course, is quite similar to the one posed by Pro0
fessor Dworkin in his discussion of the concept-conception distinction.
Dworkin might resolve it by arguing that Jones' use of general words
like "dignity" and "respect," coupled with his failure to provide specific
examples of their application or his failure to explicitly exclude black
classmates, requires the conclusion that Jones meant for his children to
be guided by "concepts" of respect and dignity and not "conceptions."
Accordingly, Jones' children would not be bound to apply their father's
instruction the same way that he surely would have; that is, to treat
their black classmate with indignity and disrespect. Jones' children
might exercise their own judgment in the matter and, while they should
8
not view themselves as having discretion "to act as they like," " they
could opt to treat their black classmate with the same dignity and respect as they accord to whites. If so, they would be acting consistently
with their father's instruction or, at the very worst, acting beyond it;
they could not be accused of acting against (or contrary to) their father's wishes. If however, Jones' instruction were viewed as incorporating specific conceptions of respect and dignity, the conclusion would be
different. According to this analysis, Jones' instruction should be interpreted as requiring, by its own terms, that his children treat their black
classmate with disrespect. To be sure, Jones did not specifically instruct
his children to do so. That is, he did not say: "You are to treat your
classmates with the same dignity and respect that you would expect
them to accord you, except that, if you ever have a black classmate,
you are to treat her with disrespect." But given Jones' personal animosity towards blacks-an animosity which he had communicated
clearly to his children-his children could have no reasonable doubt
that their father intended them to treat a black classmate as ifthe
italicized clause had been included in the instruction. They would have
no choice but to give his views special, indeed determinative, weight.
Under this interpretation, Jones' actual instruction must be viewed as
not only requiring his children to treat their black classmate with disrespect, but prohibiting them from doing otherwise. If they were to treat
her with respect, they would not be (merely) acting beyond Jones'
value judgment, but contrary to it.
Now, against the background of this discussion of Jones' instruction to his children, consider Perry's analysis of Brown v. Board of Education. The relevant "instruction" of the framers of the fourteenth
amendment is the equal protection clause's prohibition against unequal
protection of the laws. Whereas Professor Dworkin has argued that this

80.

81.

See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
R. DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 135.
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standard should be viewed as a "concept," thus leading him to conclude that Brown was a legitimate constitutional decision, 8 Perry rejects such an argument.8 3 Perry accepts Raoul Berger's historical conclusions with respect to the framers' intent concerning segregated
schools. With Berger, he concludes that the framers "did not intend
that the amendment would diminish any state's plenary control over
education." 8' 4 But Berger's conclusions are even more specific. Berger
concluded that "the North was [so] shot through with Negrophobia, ' 85
that the framers would have rejected the fourteenth amendment--or,
at the very least, that the states would not have ratified it-had they
believed it would or could be interpreted to prohibit segregated
schools. 80 And although public school systems were not as common or
extensive as they were later to become, the vast majority of those that
did exist (for example, in the District of Columbia) 8" were segregated.
Indeed, claims Berger, "there was a pervasive assumption that segregation would remain." 88 In light of this historical background, it would
appear that, were a court to be faithful to the framers' intent in the
way that Perry's theory provides, it must interpret the equal protection
clause as if it included an explicit exception for segregated schools. The
legislative history would leave no reasonable doubt that the framers intended to give their own conception of segregation-a conception which
was completely antithetical to educational equality for blacks-special,
indeed determinative, weight. They knew of the existence of segregation, they expressed their approval of the practice, and every indicia of
their behavior supports the conclusion that they believed it should be
(as it clearly was to them) required. Given Perry's complete agreement
with Berger's history, I do not find persuasive his claim that Brown
merely went beyond, but not against, the framers' value judgment.
Even assuming that Perry's distinction between extraconstitutional
and contraconstitutional decisions is more intelligible than I have suggested, it still presents significant difficulties. If the framers of a constitutional amendment accept and proceed on the basis of his distinction
they would be confronted with a serious dilemma. Assuming that constitutional framers intend their decisions (or value judgments) to bind
future generations, they have the following choice: On the one hand,

82.
83.
84.

85.
86.
74 Nw.

87.
88.

Id. at 133-34.
M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 70. See Perry, supra note 70, at 1031-32.
Perry, supra note 57, at 687 (citation omitted).
R. BERGER, supra note 35, at 10.
Id. at 183, 230-45. See Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light From the Fifteenth,
U.L. REV. 311, 326-31 (1979).
R. KLUGER, supra note 52, at 635.
R. BERGER, supra note 35, at 125.
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they can adopt constitutional language that expresses their values in
general terms, assuming that subsequent interpreters could distinguish
with precision the practices which they (the framers) intended to require from those which they merely intended not to be prohibited.
They understand that the price of confusion or ambiguity is high; if the
interpreter concludes that the framers merely intended not to prohibit a
particular practice, a decision that the practice is now invalid would,
under Perry's theory, be deemed extraconstitutional and could be defended as legitimate.8 9 On the other hand, the framers can adopt constitutional language which leaves nothing to chance. To do so, they
would have to consider each (significant?) contemporary public policy,
decide which of these should be obligatory or prohibited for subsequent
generations (to the exclusion of competing or alternative practices),
and manifest their conclusions in the text of the Constitution through
the use of the most specific and unambiguous language they can muster. 90 (Would the equal rights amendment have required sex-segregated
public toilets or merely not prohibited them?). For the serious framer,
prudence would dictate leaving nothing to chance by adopting the second, more pedantic approach. And while this approach might be
(more) effective in expressing and ensuring the vindication of the framers' intent, it would transform the Constitution into something quite
different than ours has come to be understood: a Constitution whose
code-like prolixity would permit less flexibility and adaptability than
even the most narrow contractarian constitutional theorists recommend.
As previously noted, Perry's distinction between extraconstitutional and contraconstitutional decisionmaking translates into a distinction between constitutional interpretation and electorally unaccountable
policymaking. Perry believes that the Supreme Court's modern human
rights jurisprudence can be divided neatly into two categories: decisions which interpret the Constitution and those which do not. As he
sees it, the former category is either completely or virtually empty: "the
Court's decisions regarding human rights in most modern constitutional
cases of note, and particularly in most freedom of expression and equal
protection cases, cannot plausibly be explained as 'interpretations' or
'applications' of any value judgments constitutionalized by the fram-

89. As I understand Perry, a legislative decision to this effect would be especially unproblematic. Since the legislature is an electorally accountable policymaking institution, the
problems of legitimacy simply would not arise. A judicial decision that the practice is invalid
would be legitimate if we assume that the legislature could register its approval by regulating the
Court's jurisdiction.
90. Of course, these framers might opt to manifest these conclusions in the legislative history to the amendment and hope that it later would be treated as if it were part of the text. For
reasons developed in the next section, however, this route might easily turn out to be ineffective.
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ers ..
"91 This conclusion flows from two essential propositions. First,
even though "our reading of the original understandings of constitutional provisions . . . is not perfectly accurate . . . [it) is sufficiently
accurate" for us to determine with (sufficient) confidence what the
framers intended.9" Second, for purposes of determining whether decisions are constitutional, the framers' intent (defined in terms of the
framers' own understandings of their value judgments) is dispositive. If
a decision cannot be understood as part of the framers' own value judgment, it must derive its legitimacy from outside the Constitution. I
shall now turn to an examination of the approach to the framers' intent
which underlies Perry's theory.
Ill.

TOWARDS A RECONSIDERATION OF THE APPROPRIATE ROLE OF
INTENT IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

THE FRAMERS'

In this section, I shall at least begin the task of elaborating my
conception of the appropriate role of the framers' intent in constitutional adjudication-a conception which differs quite markedly from
that held by Professor Perry (and Raoul Berger). In the first part, I
identify some of the major reasons which have been offered in support
of the view that the framers' intent should play a central and dispositive role in constitutional adjudication. I shall then assess the extent to
which the search for, and exclusive reliance upon, the framers' intent
serves or disserves its underlying purposes or rationales. In the second
part, I identify important concerns expressed in the work of prominent
theorists with respect to the coherence of methodologies of constitutional decisionmaking which place central importance on the framers'
intent. In the third part, I identify four different views of the proper
weight to be assigned to the framers' intent in constitutional analysis.
Ultimately, I shall argue for an approach which treats the framers'
intent as a relevant but not necessarily dispositive factor in constitutional interpretation.
A. Why Is the Search For the Framers' Intent Important in Constitutional Adjudication?
As Raoul Berger noted, "[ejffectuation of the draftsman's intention is a long-standing rule of interpretation in the construction of all
documents-wills, contracts, statutes-and although today such rules
are downgraded as 'mechanical' aids, they played a vastly more impor91. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 69.
92. Id. Perry reaches this conclusion despite his recognition that "it is impossible to uncover
the intentions of each of the many framers of a provision" and that "historical inquiry is inevitably subjective: to some extent our vision of the past is irremediably colored-distorted-by our
vision in the present." Id. (footnote omitted).
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tant role for the Founders."' 3 This observation can be interpreted in
two ways. First, if the Constitution is understood as constituting a contract between the people, or between the people and their government,
it is natural (at least for lawyers) to interpret that contract in a way
which gives effect to the contracting parties' intentions or expectations."' Second, Berger may have been suggesting that even if the
drafters' intent is not an indispensable aspect of contract interpretation,
we should regard it as indispensable because the framers intended for
their intent to be taken into account in the interpretation of their document, and for that reason, we should regard their intent as essential.
(This view, of course, begs the question of why their intent should be
consulted).
Also significant for the intent theory is its animating conception of
the requirements for legitimacy in judicial review. In Marbury v.
Madison," among the grounds offered by Chief Justice Marshall to
justify judicial review were the Constitution's status as the supreme law
and its direction to courts to decide cases which arise under it. The
Court's power flowed from its duty to interpret and apply the written
Constitution. The Constitution, however, contains words which generally have been considered inherently broad or ambiguous and whose
meaning can be controversial. Where this is true, the search for the
framers' intent is thought to provide more concrete or definite content
to the words and, in so doing, to limit the range of plausible judicial
interpretations. In this respect, the framers' intent serves two analytically distinct yet overlapping purposes: (1) it expresses the sense that
the task of interpreting a legal document entails a determination of the
meaning of its words, which meaning can be more clearly understood if
we appreciate what the words meant to the document's drafters; 96 (2)
the search for the framers' intent reinforces the judge's awareness that
the object of interpretation is not to give the words any meaning that
seems desirable, but to objectively discern the document's meaning to
those who drafted it. A judge who is disposed to look for the intended
meaning of others is less likely to (at least consciously) interpret the
words in light of his own sense of what they ought to mean. Thus, even
if one were to disparage the intrinsic importance of the framers' intent
in constitutional interpretation, it might still play an instrumental role
in limiting the range of alternative interpretations which could be re-

R. BERGER, supra note 35, at 365.
94. But cf. Schauer, supra note 56, at 811 (arguing that the language of the text is more
central to its meaning and interpretation than the "'psychological condition of its creator").
95. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
96. See, e.g., C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 153 (1969);
Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REV. 407 (1950).

93.
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garded as legitimate. For those who are extremely sensitive to the polit-

ical implications of judicial subjectivity or concerned with the need to
instill a greater measure of consistency and uniformity in judicial decisionmaking, the search for the framers' intent might have special
9
importance. 7
Although the equation of constitution with contract and the concern for the legitimacy of judicial review help explain the important
role the framers' intent has played in constitutional adjudication, other
reasons help account for its prominence. First, it might be supposed
that a conscious focus on history would lend stability to the judicial
reasoning process. "8 A court which feels compelled to explain the connection between the principles it articulates and those that have been
previously settled is less likely to break drastically or radically with the
past. Such a court is less likely to disappoint settled expectations and
disrupt future planning. Second, historically-rooted principles may be
especially valued by society to the extent they are perceived as representing the judgments of predecessors whose actions and wisdom are
widely regarded as heroic or deserving of honor. Drastic or precipitous
departures from such perceived wisdom may be regarded as imprudent

if not irreverent. Relatedly, a society which has experienced significant
growth and diversification in its population, as well as substantial polit97. Professor Grano has argued that approaches to constitutional interpretation which regard the framers' intent as less than dispositive invite "civil disobedience, if not outright revolution, by the judiciary, and this . . . would ultimately undermine the entire constitutional system."
Grano, supra note 30, at 61. His concerns are based substantially upon what he perceives as the
difficulties inherent in a written constitution. Constitutions, he claims, are, by their very nature,
antithetical to the concept of self-government. By denying each generation complete freedom to
make "its own judgments about morality and justice," they impose restraints on subsequent generations without the assurance of consent. Id. at 51 n.246, 53-55. To minimize this dilemma, Grano
argues that the Constitution should be read as restrictively as its language permits. He contends
that if courts fail to give the framers' intent binding effect, they would be free to expand the
historic scope of constitutional provisions. This would exacerbate the problems which inhere in a
written constitution because it would "enshrine new rights in the Constitution as effectively as
actual constitutional amendment." Id. at 60. See also Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MIcH.
L. REV. 5, 38 (1980).
Grano's argument is, to say the least, curious. It would seem that the restrictive, inter-generational effects he finds lamentable in written constitutions are exacerbated, not ameliorated, by
methodologies which assign dispositive weight to the framers' intent. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
I should also note that Grano has taken explicit exception to what he perceives to be my
position, advanced in an earlier article, that "justification may sometimes exist for disregarding.
the framers' choices." Grano, supra note 30, at 5 (citing Saphire, supra note 56, at 323 n.82). In
fact, Grano mischaracterized my prior argument. Instead of claiming that courts should disregard
the framers' intent, the footnote cited by Grano offered the suggestion, developed more extensively
in this article, that "the framers' intent need not always be dispositive (as opposed to persuasive or
important)."
98. For a classic discussion of this point, see Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290
U.S. 398, 452-53 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
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ical and cultural fragmentation, may attach special importance to the
political and moral judgments made during a past period; this is so
especially where that period is perceived as having been more stable
and homogeneous. To the extent that a legitimating force is attached to
the notion of popular consensus, or at least broad-based consent, resort
to values held and decisions made by prior generations-whose
problems are perceived as less complex and whose composition and experiences are perceived as more homogeneous--can have a comforting
and stabilizing influence. Finally, an historical focus can have special
significance for judicial interpretations of the Constitution. The judicial
process is often thought to be distinguished from the legislative process
because of its consistent invocation of systematic reasoning. Unlike
other political actors, judges must explain and justify their decision on
the basis of preexisting rules and principles. Otherwise, they would be
accused of engaging in a prospective lawmaking function to which they
are thought politically unsuited. Like textual exegesis, historical analysis may be perceived as rooted in preexisting, verifiable facts which provide an objective premise-a "shared standard of argument" 9 9-from
which the reasoning process can proceed. Thus, the search for the
framers' intent may be perceived as a check against judicial
arbitrariness.
The significance of these factors helps explain the powerful attraction of a theory of constitutional adjudication which places central importance on the framers' intent. However, there are real doubts as to
whether preoccupation with the framers' intent significantly furthers its
intended objectives, and whether those objectives might be furthered
more effectively if the emphasis on intent were diminished. First, the
notion that the Constitution is a contract whose literal terms, as understood by its drafters, must be rigidly enforced tends to lose force as we
move further away from the time of the framing. Even if we assume
that all or most persons living during the period of constitutional formulation shared the values originally embodied in the Constitution and
that they agreed to abide by its terms, this assumption loses force as
time progresses.10 0 The enormous demographic, geographical, economic, scientific, and moral development experienced by our society
over the last two hundred years makes it increasingly unlikely that
many (although certainly not all) of the values embraced by the framers-or at least their particular understanding of those values-could

99.

Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L.

REV. 1029, 1059 (1977).

100. This point is usually a prominent feature in arguments for judicial activism. See, e.g..
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 225 (1980).
For an unusual acceptance of this point by an interpretivist, see Grano, supra note 30.
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gain widespread assent today. 0 1 Moreover, because our world is, in
many ways, profoundly different from the world of our predecessors, we
inevitably have come to question their infallibility and wisdom concerning issues whose contemporary counterparts we confront. 02 Consequently, even though the framers' views may still command general respect, it becomes increasingly difficult to defer absolutely to their
judgments. As aspects of their work product lose our widely and deeply
shared adherence, continued and rigid attempts to defer to their judgments can threaten the very foundations of consent which the intent
theory is supposed to reinforce. 0
Second, the relationship of the search for the framers' intent to the
legitimacy of judicial review seems more tenuous than the intent theory
presumes. As noted above, the passing of time tends to diminish what
may have been an initially widespread and sincere popular commitment
to values constitutionalized by the framers. Consequently, rigid adherence by courts to that intent (even if only in rhetoric) can, in several
ways, adversely affect contemporary impressions with respect to the legitimacy of the exercise of judicial power. First, to the extent that the
original understanding of a constitutional provision no longer commands widespread endorsement, a court which rigidly adheres to it
may be perceived as imposing antiquated and irrelevant solutions for
modern-day problems. Relatedly, if the doubtfulness of rigid, historically-based determinations is especially conspicuous, a court's articulated preoccupation with historical materials may be widely regarded

101. For example, the framers probably did not understand the eighth amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment" to preclude many forms of punishment now
thought to be morally reprehensible. In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), in which the
Court held at least some statutory impositions of death unconstitutional, even Chief Justice Burger's dissent conceded that:
For reasons unrelated to any change in intrinsic cruelty, the Eighth Amendment prohibition cannot fairly be limited to those punishments thought excessively cruel and barbarous
at the time of the adoption of the Eighth Amendment. A punishment is inordinately cruel,
in the sense we must deal with it in these cases, chiefly as perceived by the society so
characterizing it.
Id. at 382 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Thus, in determining the constitutional validity of various
forms of state-sanctioned punishment, the Court has not confined its inquiry to the framers' understanding of "cruel" and "unusual"; instead, it has noted, "[t]he Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910)
("[tihe clause of the Constitution . . .may be therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the
obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.").
102. Munzer & Nickel, supra note 99, at 1033, 1058.
103. Since it is most likely that the diminution of respect for and adherence to the framers'
value judgments will be gradual, the notion that the formal amendment process should constitute
the exclusive legitimate method for facilitating constitutional change seems unacceptable. But see
R. BERGER, supra note 35, at 373-96. The amendment process is most viable as a method of
expressing a widespread and deeply felt desire for precipitous or cathartic change.
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as suspect. If the seriousness of a court's commitment to historical
analysis is doubted, its use of history may be perceived as the product
of manipulation or rationalization. In such situations, courts may be
perceived as acting on the basis of expediency instead of principle-a
perception which would surely promote, not allay, doubts concerning
the legitimacy of judicial review. 10
There is another way in which a rigid commitment to the framers'
intent can be viewed as perversely related to the enhancement of judicial legitimacy. Even if we assumed the continued existence of widespread respect for the framers and their value judgments, and further
assumed the importance of adhering to those judgments for the preservation of consent, the integrity of the intent theory would depend upon
our ability to confidently determine that intent. If we cannot agree
upon the elements which constitute the framers' intent, or are unable to
discover that intent by resort to determined historical analysis, the intent theory would lose most (if not all) of its legitimating force. If we
are convinced that the framers had no intent with respect to how a
constitutional provision should be applied to a problem, or if we cannot
agree where to look for that intent, or if available historical materials
are inadequate or too ambiguous for the task, courts surely will be perceived as, and indeed may be guilty of, using historical analysis surreptitiously to camouflage their personal value choices.
Earlier, I suggested that the intent theory may have value in terms
of its capacity to ensure a modicum of stability in the development of
constitutional doctrine, and that historical materials, to the extent they
provide a shared standard of argument, may facilitate greater coherence and objectivity in legal reasoning. In terms of doctrinal stability,
however, preoccupation with the framers' intent may be counterproductive. First, stability does not imply-indeed it is antithetical
to--dormancy. If legal doctrine were static-if it could not be adjusted
or made sufficiently malleable to accommodate to changing social realities-it would either be ignored or rejected. To be sure, stability also
requires that, at least in most instances, change and growth occur incrementally and not radically. Precipitous change may be problematic
to the extent it unfairly disrupts settled expectations and significantly
intrudes upon the administration and efficiency of the legal system.
Moreover, at least for those who have come to depend upon established
or evolving doctrine, erratic change in the law may be perceived as
arbitrary and incoherent, thus diminishing the institutional capital
upon which politically insulated courts may depend for their effective-

104. Cf. Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle
and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. I (1964).
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ness. Thus, stability requires an accommodation between repose and
evolution. The goal of achieving an optimal accommodation seems illserved by at least the most narrow variants of the intent theory of constitutional adjudication. If limited to a search for the precise understandings of the framers, it is unlikely that courts will produce constitutional doctrine of sufficient contemporary relevance or durability to
command widespread respect. 10 5 Similarly, even assuming that historical analysis provides a common focus for legal reasoning-and thus a
shared standard for legal argument-it will be accompanied by considerable costs. The desirability of an externally identifiable and objectifiable standard for judicial reasoning is, by and large, attributable to the
notion that legal reasoning should be circumscribed. Judges are supposed to discover the law, not create it. In constitutional cases, the relevant textual provisions-for example, those prohibiting "cruel and unusual punishment" or "unreasonable searches and seizures"-may be
considered hopelessly vague or open-ended. Reasoning which proceeds
from the text alone simply cannot provide a common point of departure
for judges with varying personal backgrounds and philosophical predispositions. To the extent historical analysis provided a common point of
departure-a point whose location was generally agreed upon and
whose contours were neatly drawn-it might well inject some measure
of uniformity and consistency into judicial decisions, and thus serve to
enhance perceptions that judicial power has been exercised rationally
and legitimately. But those perceptions are undermined where judicial
reasoning proceeds under the assumption that the framers' conceptions,
once discovered, are to be applied mechanically to answer contemporary political and moral questions. First, disagreement among judges
over the "correct" historical solution is inevitable, thus casting suspicion on the objectivity of historical analysis and leading to the sort of
inconsistent conclusions which the "shared historical standard"' was
thought to avoid.10 6 Moreover, the notion that history can or should

105. See Munzer & Nickel, supra note 99, at 1032, 1058.
106. For example, in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982), the Supreme Court, by a
vote of 5-4, held that the President has absolute immunity from damages liability for acts within
the "outer perimeter" of his official responsibility. The majority opinion, written by Justice Powell,
included among the appropriate sources for judicial consideration "the Constitution, federal statutes, and history," but noted also that the Court must necessarily weigh "concerns of public policy, especially as illuminated by our history and the structure of our government." Id. at 2701..
The Court noted that "any historical analysis must draw its evidence primarily from our constitutional heritage and structure." Id. Although the Court concluded that "[h]istorical inquiry thus
merges almost at its inception with the kind of 'public policy' analysis appropriately undertaken
by a federal court," id., it did, in an extensive footnote, engage in a more focused examination of
the framers' intent. Id. at 2702 n.31. It noted the existence of "historical evidence from which it
[could] be inferred that the Framers assumed the President's immunity from damages liability,"
finding particularly relevant "concern" expressed by "several delegates" to the Constitutional
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immediately and directly govern the resolution of modern problems is
likely to be subject to sufficiently widespread doubt that a court's endorsement of it may not enjoy much credibility, further fueling suspicion that historical analysis is deployed to camouflage the judges' personal policy preferences. Finally, even if historical reasoning were
capable of yielding decisions accepted as congruent with the framers'
understanding, those decisions might often be so inconsistent with our
society's contemporary views as to make the application of the framers'
conceptions seem unjust. In such cases, any enhanced methodological
integrity flowing from a court's adoption of a strict standard of historical analysis might well be overshadowed by a general perception of the
unfairness of its decisions.
While the above discussion is not intended to suggest that a search
for the framers' intent is unimportant in constitutional adjudication, it
may provide some basis to question the plausibility of theories which
presume that the original understanding is (aside from the constitu-

Convention "that subjecting the President even to impeachment would impair his capacity to perform his duties of office." Id. (citation omitted). Apparently lacking any more affirmative support
from the historical record, the Court noted that "nothing in [the framers'] debates suggests an
expectation that the President would be subjected to the distraction of suits by disappointed private citizens," and concluded:
In light of the fragmentary character of the most important materials reflecting the
Framers' intent, we do think that the most compelling arguments arise from the Constitution's separation of powers and the judiciary's historic understanding of that doctrine. But
our primary reliance on constitutional structure and judicial precedent should not be misunderstood. The best historical evidence clearly supports the Presidential immunity we
have upheld.
Id. (citation omitted).
Justice White, in dissent, accused the Court of abandoning "basic principles that have been
powerful guides to decision" and of making "almost wholly a policy choice." Id. at 2712. Lamenting the majority's consignment of analysis of the framers' intent to a footnote, Justice White's
examination of the Constitutional Convention's debates led him to the view that "[tihe only conclusions that can be drawn from this debate are that the independence of the Executive was not
understood to require a total lack of accountability to the other branches and that there was no
general desire to insulate the President from the consequences of his improper acts." Id. at 2714
(footnote omitted). In an appended footnote, he suggested that the majority was manipulating
historical analysis to comport with a conclusion reached upon pure policy grounds. Id. at 2714
n.13.
It seems to me that one would have to strain to conclude that the majority's (or, for that
matter, the dissent's) resolution of the Presidential immunity issue was, in any plausible sense,
"compelled" by the framers' intent. Be that as it may, however, it simply defies common sense to
suggest that historical analysis-which included, but was not limited to, the framers' intent-provided a "shared standard of argument" which, in any meaningful sense, served to objectify the judicial decisionmaking process. Moreover, in times like these when the justices seem
hardly able to restrain themselves from taking potshots at each other in the course of their diverging opinions, see. e.g.. id. at 2703 n.31 (where the Court said, alluding to the dissent's analysis,
that "historical evidence must be weighed as well as cited"), claims that doctrine, such as that
enunciated in Harlow, is objectively deduced from the framers' intent may well serve to undermine the Court's credibility.
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tional text) the exclusive and dispositive source of constitutional interpretation. The values of consent, stability, and judicial legitimacy are,
at best, served only imperfectly by modes of adjudication which are
preoccupied with the original intent. Indeed, these values may often be
disserved by such a focus. But notions that these values are central to
constitutionalism and to a tolerable accommodation of judicial review
with democratic political theory remain deeply entrenched, as does the
view that they can only be respected by discovering and adhering
closely to the framers' intent.
B.

Determining the Framers' Intent

Recent scholarship has raised important doubts about the very intelligibility and coherence of the search for the framers' intent in constitutional interpretation. For example, Professor Dworkin, who previously argued that the framers' particular conceptions of the meaning of
important constitutional provisions were entitled to little weight, i " has
recently questioned the very rationality of the intent theory. Dworkin
notes that while "the rival schools on constitutional intention" each recognize the problematical nature of searching for either an individual or
collective intention, they disagree on the importance of at least undertaking the historical analysis:
One side argues that in spite of the difficulties every effort must be
made, with the resources of history and analysis, to discover what the
collective intention of the constitutional Framers was on disputed matters of interpretation. . . . The other side argues that any effort to discover the original intention of the Framers will turn out to be fruitless,
or even perverse.'"

Dworkin believes that both of these approaches suffer from a common
misconception:
Both sides to this debate suppose that the intention of the Framers,
if it exists at all, is some complex psychological fact locked in history
waiting to be winkled out from old pamphlets and letters and proceedings. But this is a serious common mistake, because there is no such
thing as the intention of the Framers waiting to be discovered, even in
principle. There is only some such thing waiting to be invented. 1 "
Dworkin goes on to argue that we share no single, fixed concept of the
framers' intent-that there are only competing conceptions-and that
we have no generally accepted conventions on the matter which might.
107.
108.
omitted).
109.

R. DwORKIN, supra note 30, at 135.
Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 476-77 (1981) (footnote
Id. at 477.
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be considered settled by legal practice. Thus, "[t]he idea of an original
constitutional understanding. . . cannot be the start or the ground of a
theory of judicial review. '""1 Any theory of the original understanding
must be preceded by a substantive theory of political morality.
On a more technical level, Dworkin joins with Paul Brest"' and,
before him, Jacobus tenBroek,'1 2 in identifying issues which intent theorists must confront, but which they generally have avoided. For example, whose intention counts? Do we look exclusively for the understandings of the men who drafted the relevant constitutional provision, or do
we also consider the views of delegates to the state ratifying conventions?"' 8 If our analysis of the constitutional and ratifying conventions
conflict, how is the conflict to be resolved? Moreover, are we to focus
exclusively or primarily on the understanding of a provision's sponsor? 1 1 ' If so, how do we determine that understanding? By reference

I10. Id. at 478.
I1I. Brest, supra note 100.
112. tenBroek, Admissibility and Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic
Aids in Constitutional Construction, 26 CALIF. L. REV. 287, 437, 664 (1938); tenBroek, Use by
the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction, 27 CALIF. L.
REV. 157 (1939).
113. With respect to the relevance of the ratifying conventions, consider the following views:
But if we are really searching for the states of mind of those responsible for the presence in the Constitution of a particular provision, it is hard to understand why we shouild
be particularly concerned only with those who drafted the provision or supported it actively. Responsibility is more widely distributed; in order to become part of the Constitution, the provision had to be accepted by the Philadelphia Convention or by the Congress,
and then ratified by the states acting either through legislatures or through special
conventions.
Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in ConstitutionalInterpretation,31 U. CHI. L.
REV. 502, 508 (1964).

Now obviously there is no principled basis on which the intent of those voting to ratify can
be counted less.crucial in determining the 'true meaning' of a constitutional provision than
the intent of those in Congress who proposed it. That gets to include so many different
people in so many different circumstances, however, that one cannot hope to gather a reliable picture of their intentions from any perusal of the legislative history. . . .Thus the
only reliable evidence of what 'the ratifiers' thought they were ratifying is the language of
the provision they approved.
J.ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 17 (1980).
Although the intention of the ratifiers, not the Framers, is in principle decisive, the
difficulties of ascertaining the intent of the ratifiers leaves little choice but to accept the
intent of the Framers as a fair reflection of it.
Monaghan, supra note 30, at 375 n.130 (citing J. ELY, supra, at 17-18).
At least some justices continue to place importance on the state ratifying conventions in determining the framers' intent. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 2714-15 (1982)
(White, J.,
dissenting). However, in other cases, consideration (or even mention) of the ratifying
conventions is noticeably absent from even the most extensive analysis of the framers' intent. See,
e.g.. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 102 S. Ct. 2126, 2154-56 (1982)
(O'Connor, J.,concurring and dissenting in part).
114. In this regard, consider John Wofford's observation of the dilemma raised by seeking
to resolve the inevitable conflict between the articulated views expressed by various drafters:
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only to formal statements or arguments made from the floor of the convention or the House or Senate? By reference to such arguments in the
context of earlier or later public or private pronouncements? By reference to the sponsor's broader philosophy as articulated at another time
or as implied from his position on other policy matters? 115 Should we
count the views of a provision's critics and then determine how others
responded to this criticism? Where attempts to resolve these questions
leave us uncertain, should we look outside the constitutional and ratifying conventions for help? Should we consult contemporaneous expositions by prominent commentators, such as the FederalistPapers? If so,
must we discount their authoritativeness in light of their propagandist
nature?116
Assuming that we could agree on whose intent is (most) relevant,
how would we actually determine that intent? What constitutes,that
intent? Do we focus on the purely subjective, psychological state of the
17
individual, or should we concentrate on objective indicia of intent?'
Does an individual's intent consist of what he actually believes his
words and statements to mean, or of how he believes others will or
should interpret them?1 1 8 And if we determined that a framer had a
very specific and narrow understanding of a provision's meaning,
should we ignore the fact that he proposed or agreed to language which

"Surely some members of the Convention were more influential than others in the formulation of

particular propositions and phrases, and presumably their intents are entitled to special weight."
Wofford, supra note 113, at 507. Clearly "history" cannot resolve this dilemma for us. The modern day interpreter can only select the articulated view which either best comports with her impression of other historical materials, or, perhaps inevitably, substantiates conclusions drawn from
other sources. In any event, it does not appear that resolution of this sort of problem can be
"historically neutral." As Wofford noted: "The conceptions of what occurred at Philadelphia remain, as Farrand put it, 'ours.'" Id. at 506.
The significance of this dilemma is demonstrated in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690
(1982), discussed supra note 106. In dissent, Justice White responded, in part, to petitioner's
reliance upon Hamilton's Federalist No. 77 as follows: "There is no more reason to respect the
views of Hamilton than those of Wilson: both were members of the constitutional convention; both
were instrumental in securing the ratification of the Constitution." Id. at 2715.
115. For example, Professor Dimond traces Representative John Bingham's political career,
including positions he took as a county prosecutor in 1846, his support for Zachary Taylor's nomination in 1848, and his "turn toward the Western Reserve philosophy" in 1854, in support of his
claim that Bingham, as a principal actor in the framing of the fourteenth amendment, advocated
a broad conception of civil rights. See generally Dimond, supra note 44, at 481-94.
116. See tenBroek, Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction, 27 CAUF. L. REV. 157, 157-71 (1939).
117. See Dworkin, supra note 108, at 482.
118. Professor Dworkin notes the distinction between the "speaker's meaning" and the
"speaker's expectation." The former "is determined by what the speaker expects the hearer to
understand the speaker is intending him to understand"; the latter includes the speaker's "hopes
about how he will be understood." Id. at 483-84. Dworkin contends that any choice between these
two psychological states is precisely that, a choice. Such choices, he argues, cannot be defended in
"some more neutral, purely historical way." Id. at 491.
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seems particularly ill-suited to convey such a restrictive meaning?"
And what if the individual in question held both concrete and abstract
intentions with respect to a particular provision? Which is most important to a true interpretation of his understanding? 20 Finally, assuming
that these problems could be resolved satisfactorily, intent theory must
confront the even more intractable difficulties inherent in the determination of institutional or group intention. Under the Constitution, an
amendment can be proposed by Congress with the approval of at least
two-thirds of the membership of both Houses."' It is, of course, implausible to suggest that each person voting for a provision had an exactly identical understanding of its meaning and effect. Some persons
may have had no particular understanding of a provision's meaning,
while others may have had no hopes or expectations concerning how
others (including subsequent authoritative interpreters) would understand it. Still others may have had contradictory understandings, hopes,
and expectations. There would appear to be no single approach for
resolving such issues, " ' and it seems unlikely that the framers' intent
itself would compel the adoption of any particular approach. As Profes-

sor Dworkin notes, the formulation of a unified approach-itself an unlikely prospect-would require resort to political (or perhaps social
only
choice) 2 3 theory. Ultimately, such an approach could be justified
24

in terms of that theory, not in terms of the framers' intent.'

119. It is highly implausible that people who believe their own opinions about what
counts as equality or justice should be followed, even if these beliefs are wrong, would use
only the general language of equality and justice in framing their commands.
Id. at 494. See Bickel, supra note 53, at 59; Dimond, supra note 44, at 465-68.
120. See Dworkin, supra note 108, at 488-97; Sandalow, supra note 1, at 1046, 1067. Professor Dworkin also notes the difficulties in determining the framers' "interpretive intentions";
that is, in determining whether the framers had any intentions with respect to how these myriad
interpretive problems should be resolved by subsequent authoritative interpreters. Dworkin, supra
note 108, at 494-95. See also Brest, supra note 100, at 212, 215-16.
121. U.S. CONST. art. V.
122. Professor Brest suggests that conflicting intentions within the relevant group of framers
could be resolved by assigning each an "intention vote." Brest, supra note 100, at 212-13. Professor Dworkin counters by suggesting a "representative intention" approach to resolve such conflicts. Dworkin, supra note 108, at 488.
123. Dworkin, supra note 108, at 498. Professor Easterbrook has offered the provocative,
albeit further complicating, suggestion that even if a court were committed to adhering to the
framers' intent, and even if that intent could plausibly be discerned, intent generally would not
determine the resolution of many cases. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 802 (1982). He contends that the decisions of any group are affected by the order in which
that group considers its options and that "[tlhe order of decisions has nothing to do with the
intent of the framers or any of the other things that might inform constitutional interpretation."
Id. at 820 (footnote omitted).
124. Any justification for one construction, and therefore for one view of what the
Framers intended, must be found not in history or semantic or conceptual analysis, but in
But then the idea with which we began, that judges can make apolitipolitical theory ...

Published by eCommons, 1982

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 8:3

Although I shall not here attempt to suggest approaches for resolving these problems, I think they have important implications for constitutional theory and adjudication. First, they suggest that the search for
the framers' intent, like textual exegesis or reasoning from constitutional structure,1 2 5 is a terribly complex business fraught with serious
and important methodological problems. Recognition of these problems
should lead to a healthy dose of skepticism in evaluating the claims of

cal constitutional decisions by discovering and enforcing the intention of the Framers, is a
promise that cannot be redeemed. For judges cannot discover that intention without building or adopting one conception of constitutional intention rather than another, without, that
is, making the decisions of political morality they were meant to avoid.
Dworkin, supra note 108, at 498.
125. For the most prominent elaboration of structural analysis in constitutional law,. see C.
BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
It is worth noting that interpretive theorists, even those who take the most rigid views with
respect to the dispositiveness of the framers' intent, generally concede that the constitutional
structure constitutes a legitimate source for constitutional decisionmaking. In a sense, this concession is not surprising. Indeed, it has been noted that structural analysis "suggests, quite plausibly,
that there was a meaningful original intent-a 'sovereign act of will'-that went into the creation
of the Constitution's structures and relationships as well as into the creation of its grants and
prohibitions," and that judicial intervention on behalf of constitutional structures and relationships
"can be justified as an attempt to restore (more accurately, to approximate in the modern setting)
the political power equilibrium envisioned by the framers." Blasi, Creativity and Legitimacy in
Constitutional Law (Book Review), 80 YALE L.J. 176, 192-93 (1970). Thus, structural reasoning
would appear to satisfy the interpretivists' insistence that constitutional principles be derived from
the text of the Constitution and the framers' intent. Instead of beginning the analysis by resorting
to extraconstitutional sources, the analysis proceeds by determining the character of the governmental institutions and relationships expressly established by the Constitution, and then determines which rights and powers are necessary, desirable or even fundamental to their effective (and
intended) operation. By definition, this analysis presumes the relevance of the Constitution and its
essential role as (at least) the starting point in constitutional interpretation. To be sure, the rights
derived from this reasoning process are not actually expressed in the Constitution, but we are
asked to assume that, at least in some contexts, the written Constitution cannot fairly be understood as exhaustive.
In another sense, however, the interpretivists' ready endorsement of structural modes of constitutional interpretation is somewhat anomalous, because it would appear that such modes are as
malleable and subject to manipulation as those methodologies which permit judges to consult concededly extraconstitutional sources. As Professor Blasi has noted: "The problem is that decisions
alchemized out of inferences from structure and relationship might also be 'suspected of being
arbitrary'" and "[t]he structural approach cannot be considered an advance in Wechslerian
terms: there is nothing to suggest that structural decisions would be any more 'neutral,' 'generalized,' or 'principled,' whatever one might mean by those amorphous terms." Id. at 190-91. Thus,
for example, Dean Ely's theory of judicial review, J.ELY, sipra note 113, perhaps the most prominent contemporary example of a structuralist-based constitutional theory, has been widely criticized for giving too much interpretive discretion to the judge. See, e.g., M. PERRY, supra note 2,.
at 77-90, 119-22; Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979
WASH. U.L.Q. 695, 698-99; Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John
Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980). For a recent critique of structural
reasoning in the right-to-travel area, see Zobel v. Williams, 102 S. Ct. 2309, 2319
(1983)(O'Connor, J.,concurring)(arguing that, instead of relying upon inferences drawn from
political-historical observations about the nature of federalism the Court should "articulate [the)
constitutional principle, explaining its textual sources.").
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some constitutional theorists, like Raoul Berger and Michael Perry,
that we can know with complete certainty (or at least with suitable
confidence) what the framers did or did not intend, at least with respect to the more open-ended constitutional provisions. At the very
least, we should be reluctant to uncritically accept the notion that the
search for intent can be undertaken on the assumption that historical
analysis is inherently "objective" or "principled" in a way which other
modes of constitutional analysis are not. This is not to say that historical analysis must be deemed inherently, completely, and irretrievably
subjective, or that it would be impossible to construct a theory of interpretation which would respond adequately to a claim that any search
for the framers' intent is destined to be arbitrary or unprincipled. I do
believe, however, that recognition of the methodological dilemmas alluded to above diminishes the forcefulness of claims, such as those
made by Professor Perry, that there is a bright line separating values
which were constitutionalized by the framers from those that either
were not consciously accepted or that were rejected by them.",
Recognition of the methodological problems inherent in determining the framers' intent suggests a further concern which I believe has
special significance for constitutional theory. On the one hand, at least
on the level of pure historicity, Professor Dworkin's claim that a fram-

126. Perry's historical conclusions, substantially based upon the work of Raoul Berger, are
made with a confidence which is particularly bold and unequivocal. Given the vigorous and ongoing nature of the debate centering on the historical interpretation of the fourteenth amendment,
some may find his confidence surprising-perhaps even arrogant. I do not. Although my own
assessment of the historical scholarship upon which Perry relies leaves me considerably less sanguine than Perry with respect to Berger's conclusions, Berger's work unquestionably represents
some of the most comprehensive and detailed research yet undertaken concerning the historical
background of the fourteenth amendment. At the very least, Berger's historical conclusions must
be deemed plausible, even if they are not accepted as compelling or dispositive. Perry's decision to
accept Berger's conclusions and, despite their contraindication, to defend an activist role for the
Court in human rights adjudication, makes his theory of judicial review especially important and
unique. (In this regard, the reader may find Berger's evaluation of Perry's theory, included in this
Symposium, to be of particular interest. See Berger, Michael Perry's Functional Justificationfor
Judicial Activism, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 465 (1983)).
Having said this, however, I must confess to being disappointed with Perry's failure to confront the methodological problems associated with identifying the framers' intent. The closest he
comes to even recognizing these problems is to note that "[a]scertaining the precise contours of
the original understanding of any given provision may be difficult, sometimes even impossible."
M. PERRY, supra note 2, at I n.0 (citing, e.g.. Brest, supra note 100). He goes on to argue that "it
is usually possible to ascertain the rough contours of that understanding" and that "[tlhe historian's ability to ascertain the rough contours of the original understanding of the various constitutional provisions discussed or mentioned in this book is sufficient for purposes of the claims about
the original understanding on which I rely." Id. If there is a theory of interpretation which would
justify Perry's confidence in the historical conclusions which are central to his theory of judicial
review, it has yet to be elaborated. See Alexander, Painting Without the Numbers: Noninterpretive Judicial Review. 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 447 (1983).
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ers' intent can only be invented, not discovered, 1 7 seems compelling.
On the other hand, we know that identifiable groups of persons were
centrally involved in the creation of our Constitution and that, with
considered historical research, we can at least approximate what Professor Perry refers to as the "rough contours"' a of the moral values
and broad political objectives to which they subscribed. These two realities have presented what I believe has been a fundamental paradox for
constitutional theory. To the extent that our constitutional jurisprudence has been (purportedly) dependent on the framers' intent, it has
been premised in an abstraction: there is no such thing as a concrete
and knowable intent of the framers-at least when that intent is defined as the collective, conscious, subjective state of mind of at least a
majority of those persons who voted to adopt and ratify the Constitution. 129 Instead, what "exists" for us, and all that we can seriously.hope
to find, is the historical context of the periods in which constitutional
texts were formulated. This context offers us a m6lange of ideas and
principles which achieved general acceptance and adherence. We can,
and I think inevitably will, seek to identify and consult these ideas and
principles in our effort to resolve the political and moral issues of our
own time. But the historical context of the framing cannot, by itself,
answer the problems of a later day. When we attribute to the framers
the authority or responsibility for the answers we give to our constitutional questions, we cannot avoid recognizing that the ultimate authority and responsibility is really our own.
If the framers' intent does not exist in the way that much of contemporary constitutional theory supposes, in what sense has it constituted a paradox for constitutional theory? The paradox, I believe, lies
in the fact that, despite its abstract and illusory nature, we continue to
insist upon (or, for some, perhaps concede) its centrality in constitutional interpretation. For example, after offering a devastating critique

127. Dworkin, supra note 108, at 477.
128. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at I n.0.
129. It might be argued that it would have been possible to determine the concrete state of
mind of the framers immediately after the adoption and ratification of the Constitution. At least
then it may have been possible to question each of the framers concerning what they thought a
provision meant (in both the abstract and concrete senses) and how it would be applied in various
contexts. But even here, the notion that we could identify their individual or collective intent
would be problematic. First, we would have no way of knowing whether they would have answered the same questions in the same way had they been asked before their votes were cast: their
subsequent statements of intent could well be colored by post-adoption argument, debate and
events. Second, if we asked them how they thought the provision in question would be applied to
events which they could then contemplate, we would have no way of knowing whether their answers would be the same for supposedly analogous conditions, occurring far in the future, which
they could not possibly predict. In any event, we have no known way of communicating with the
framers at this late date.
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of intent theories and concluding that an originalist interpreter operates
"in a fantasy world more of her own than of the adopters' making, '1 3 0
Professor Brest advocates a nonoriginalist methodology which treats
the original understanding as entitled to presumptive ("important but
not determinative") weight.13' What, it might be asked, is the rationality of a mode of interpretation which gives presumptive weight to something which (at least in most cases) 13 exists only in our fantasies? The
answer, I think, can be found in the recognition that the concept of the
"framers' intent" is merely a linguistic device which has come to be
used as a symbolic embodiment of our need to establish the historical
roots for our most basic legal principles. To concede that those roots
are spread throughout the historical soil of our entire national experience (with, perhaps, special significance attached to the cathartic
events immediately surrounding the promulgation of our constitutional
text) is, for reasons which I find difficult to specify, less comforting
than to perpetuate the myth that they emanate from (are personified
by?) the minds of identifiable people. In essence, the framers' intent is
an artifact which we (viz. judges and constitutional theorists) have created to satisfy our sense of order and our innate need to have those who
have preceded us share our responsibility for the world we confront.
Given this conception of the framers' intent, what modifications of
perspective might facilitate greater coherence and rationality in our approach to the problems of constitutional theory? Perhaps we could
avoid the troublesome implications inherent in the illusive and abstract
nature of the framers' intent in the following way. We could concede
that "historical inquiry is inevitably subjective," admit that our reading
of the past cannot be "perfectly accurate,"' 33 and then go on to conclude that we must be content simply to proceed upon the estimate of
intent which seems to us most (however imperfectly) accurate or congenial. Or, with Professor Monaghan, we might concede that some vital
elements which constitute the framers' intent are simply unascertainable and resign ourselves to treating elements we feel we can ascertain
as a "fair reflection of the whole.'"" But in my judgment, such ap-

130. Brest, supra note 100, at 221.
131. Id. at 229. See tenBroek, supra note 116, at 400, 411-12.
132. It may be that in the case of the Constitution's housekeeping provisions, such as the
requirements of minimum ages for public office or of a two-thirds approval by both Houses of
Congress of constitutional amendments, the language used will be considered so concise and unambiguous that either resort to the framers' intent will be thought unnecessary or a consensus on
the subjective intent of the framers will be probable. Interpretation of such provisions need not,
however, treat even such unambiguous expression of intent as inherently dispositive. See infra
notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
133. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 69.
134. Monaghan, supra note 30, at 130. See also J. ELY, supra note 113, at 16-17;
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proaches are wholly unsatisfactory; they tend to perpetuate a myth and
reinforce our delusions.
It seems to me that the most intelligible way to deal with the illusive nature of the framers' intent is to account for its inherent limitations in the way we employ it. I believe that this can be accomplished
most sensibly in the context of determining the weight we choose to
assign it in the process of constitutional interpretation. I shall address
this problem in the balance of this section. Before proceeding, however,
a note of clarification must be made. Given my view of the intractable
dilemma inherent in the search for the individual and collective intentions of those individuals who were centrally involved in the promulgation of our constitutional texts, and given the fact that the term "framers' intent" has become so closely associated with the personal,
subjective views of those individuals, I believe that continued reference
to "the framers' intent" in the discourse of constitutional theory should
generally be avoided. Accordingly, throughout the balance of this article, instead of using the term "framers' intent" I shall use the term
"the Constitution's historical context" to denote the principles and
ideas which most importantly influenced the development of our constitutional texts.1"' To be sure, any attempt to identify those principles
and ideas will necessarily require reference to the views articulated by
those persons who were most prominently involved in the events which
preceded and surrounded the drafting of the relevant text. But, in a
very real sense, our foundational principles and ideas transcend the
views expressed by particular persons. Those principles and ideas are
epochal; they must be extrapolated, however imperfectly, from the
events of an entire political era.
C. Assigning the Appropriate Weight to the Constitution's Historical
Context
There are, it seems to me, at least four positions that might be
taken with respect to the appropriate weight to be attributed to the
Constitution's historical context. First, one could conclude that the historical context is always absolutely dispositive or binding.1 6 Second,
the historical context could be given "presumptive" weight. By "presumptive," I mean that the historical context would be regarded as
controlling unless it was clearly controverted by other factors (e.g.,

Monaghan, supra note 46, at 126.
135. Occasionally, it will be necessary for me to use the term framers' intent when I discuss
various aspects of traditional intent theory. In such instances I shall place quotation marks around
the term (i.e., "framers' intent") to remind the reader of its illusory nature.
136. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448-83 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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where the "plain meaning" of the text cannot plausibly be reconciled
with the historical context, or where the historical context is simply so
inconsistent with contemporary thinking that giving it effect would generate decisions which would be widely condemned as anachronistic or
arbitrary). Here the historical context could, but need not, be treated
as dispositive. 3 7 Third, one could consider the historical context as one
relevant factor among many, entitled only to the weight or importance
which it is thought to "deserve." ' 38 Finally, one could argue that the
historical context is generally,1 39 or at least occasionally,"1 0 irrelevant to
contemporary constitutional interpretation.
The tenability of each of these positions would, to a large extent,
depend upon the status of the historical record. The strongest case for
the first alternative-treating the historical context as dispositive-would be based upon an historical record which is completely accessible and unambiguous.' If we know or strongly suspect that im-

137. See. e.g.. Brest, supra note 100, at 229-36.
138. See. e.g., Munzer & Nickel, supra note 99, at 1054; tenBroek, supra note 116, at 411.
139. See. e.g.. Miller, An Inquiry into the Relevance of the Intentions of the Founding
Fathers, With Special Emphasis Upon the Doctrine of Separation of Powers. 27 ARK. L. REV.
583, 584 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Miller, Separationof Powers]; Miller, If "The Devil Himself Knows Not the Mind of Man, ' How Possibly Can Judges Know the Motivation of Legislators?, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1167, 1170 (1978).
140.

See, e.g.. SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 72-73 (E. Cahn ed. 1954) (comments

of Charles P. Curtis). It is sometimes suggested that constitutional provisions can be broken down
into two types of clauses. According to this "two-clause" theory, the interpretation of one type of
clause would be strictly governed by the Constitution's historical context; interpretation of the
other type might disregard that context. See generally C. MILLER, supra note 96, at 161-69;
Monaghan, supra note 30, at 361-67.
141. Accessibility would be determined by the current availability of comprehensive and
contemporary records of the debates and other relevant pronouncements of the constitutive generation. Ambiguity would be judged by the extent to which the record yields hopelessly conflicting
evidence of a coherent historical context. For example, where the relevant framers simply did not
discuss or debate the meaning or scope of a provision, the record (and their "intent," if indeed
they had any) might be considered unclear. It should be noted that at least according to some
approaches, the "framers' intent" might always be considered inherently inaccessible and ambiguous. This might be the case for those who believe that a true understanding of "intent" depends
upon an understanding of the broader social and political context in which the framers lived. For
example, if the words used are considered an important indicia of "intent," it would be important
to understand how they were understood at the time. See. e.g., Mickenberg, Abusing the Exceptions and Regulations Clause: Legislative Attempts to Divest the Supreme Court of Appellate
Jurisdiction, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 801 (1983); Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate
Jurisdictionof the Supreme Court. 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 168-71 (1960); Wofford, supra note
113, at 513. Moreover, if one believes that the meaning of constitutional words can only be understood in the context of the political or moral philosophy of the framers, one must confront and
interpret the intellectual climate at the time of the framing and determine how it influenced the
framers' (individual and/or collective) perceptions of particular provisions and perhaps of constitutionalism itself. Although there have been some admirable works of this nature, see, e.g.. B.
BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); G. WOOD, THE

CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969); Grey, Origins. supra note 30, one
would be hard-pressed to find a consensus among historians or lawyers with respect to a specific
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portant records are incomplete or unavailable (once we have concluded
which records are relevant to our investigation) we are likely to be reluctant to have complete confidence in our historical assessment.'"
Even the more pragmatic intent theorists who believe that the currently
best available evidence of the "framers' intent" is sufficient 143 would
have to concede the provisional nature of constitutional doctrine: a
prior decision would have to be reconsidered and perhaps even abandoned in light of future historical revelations. Given the fact that new
historical research may reveal additional relevant data (not to mention
the possibility that new and more persuasive interpretations of existing
data may evolve), historically-based decisions may be inherently less
stable than intent theory supposes. And although an intent theorist
might argue that doctrine based exclusively upon current, albeit only
tentative, understandings of the "framers' intent" is preferable to that
which is based upon such understandings in combination with other,
more contemporary factors, it is not clear why this should be so. Once
we concede the imperfection of historical analysis, the social contractconsent-stability arguments for intent theory begin to unravel. Moreover, the historical focus loses its capacity to constrain judicial reasoning and to ensure the consistency, durability and predictability of constitutional doctrine.
The tentativeness inherent in historically-based constitutional interpretation would also appear to place in doubt the wisdom of attaching presumptive (although not necessarily dispositive) weight to the
Constitution's historical context. Although this approach permits deviation from the historical context when other factors are especially compelling, it still would, by definition, consider that context as the most
important element in a constitutional decision. Moreover, if it were
taken seriously, it would in most cases treat the historical context as

"intent" behind many constitutional clauses. Compare, e.g., Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975) (contending that given the pre-Revolutionary licensing of the press and the
framers' reaction to it, the framers intended, through the press clause of the first amendment, to
confer special constitutional status on the press), with Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23
UCLA L. REV. 77, 88-99 (1975) (contending that in light of the "heritage" of the framers' struggle against press-licensing in pre-Revolutionary times, the press clause was not intended to confer
special status on the press).
142. John Wofford has argued that the records of the Philadelphia Convention are generally
incomplete and inaccurate, thus raising doubts concerning any attempt to determine the historical
context surrounding the original Constitution. Wofford, supra note 113, at 504-06. Professor Dimond has argued that "[tihe legislative debates from 1864 through 1875 concerning civil rights,
antidiscrimination, and Reconstruction reveal much. . .passion, prejudice, and politics"-"complicating factors [which] merely add to the difficulty in divining any narrowly confined, but generally agreed-upon, intent of the framers." Dimond, supra note 44, at 507 n.244.
143. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 30, at 377.
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determinative. 14

783

Consequently, the same considerations militating

144. In this regard, there appears to be at least some ambiguity in the conception of the
"framers' intent" developed by Professor Brest. Brest, supra note 100. Brest's critics have claimed
that his approach would permit the Court to completely disregard the Constitution's historical
context and that it would undermine the binding nature of the Constitution. See, Berger, Paul
Brest's Brief for an Imperial Judiciary, 40 MD. L. REV. 1 (1981); Grano, supra note 30, at 5-7;
Monaghan, supra note 30, at 381-87. Indeed, Brest is quite critical of the notion that the Constitution's historical context should bind contemporary constitutional interpretation. Descriptively, he
notes that "the practice of supplementing and derogating from the text and original understanding
is itself part of our constitutional tradition." Brest, supra note 100, at 225. Normatively, he advocates abandoning "both consent and fidelity to the text and original understanding as the touchstones of constitutional decisionmaking," and goes on to identify five factors a court should consider in evaluating the constitutionality of a practice-factors which are designed to implement
the essential, but "designedly vague criterion [of] [h]ow well . . . the practice contribute[s] to the
well-being of our society--or, more narrowly, to the ends of constitutional government." Id. at
226. None of these factors explicitly incorporates analysis of the Constitution's historical context.
Brest goes on to define his thesis as one "which treats the text and original history as important
but not necessarily authoritative." Id. at 228. Later, he describes his proposal for nonoriginalist
adjudication as follows:
For the nonoriginalist, [the text and original understanding] are important but not determinative. Like an established line of precedent at common law, they create a strong presumption, but one which is defeasible in the light of changing public values. . . .The presumption is most likely to be overcome in adjudication under broad clauses involving issues of
equality and liberty, where legal and moral principles are closely intertwined.
Id. at 229. See also. id. at 205.
The ambiguity in Brest's analysis derives from contrasting the five factors which he would
have courts consider with his claim that original history should be considered "important but not
necessarily authoritative" and entitled to a "strong presumption." As previously noted, none of
these factors explicitly direct a court's attention to the original understanding (e.g., does the challenged practice "foster democratic government" or is it "acceptable to the populace?"). In what
way, then, does Brest's analysis recognize the "importance" of the Constitution's historical context? He writes that adoption of his thesis would "not automatically foreclose either strict or
moderate originalism. It may still be contended that the ends of constitutionalism are best served
by enforcing only values embodied in the text and original understanding of the Constitution." Id.
at 227 (footnote omitted). But how and when is the Court to consider the original understanding
in reaching its decision? And by what process is the original understanding factored into the five
criteria that the Court is directed to consider? Perhaps most importantly, in what sense is the
Constitution's historical context "presumptively binding"?
If Brest is to be understood as arguing that the presumptive weight of the historical context is
to be recognized only where the text is contemporary, the "presumption" would be meaningless
for adjudication implicating the Civil War Amendments and the original Constitution and the Bill
of Rights. Moreover, if the presumption were to attach only where the original understandings
retain a widespread, contemporary sense of relevance and approval, its role as a distinctive element in constitutional analysis would be blurred: Courts otherwise inclined to reject intent theory
would decide most cases consistent with the results that theory would have generated. Similarly, if
the presumption is to be routinely overcome in "adjudication under broad clauses involving issues
of equality and liberty," it would be irrelevant to most contemporary human rights adjudication.
Although Brest may in fact believe that original intent is important and that it should not casually
be disregarded, his nonoriginalism theory cannot sensibly be understood as according it a true
presumption. Consequently, the point of his claim that nonoriginalist adjudication can be reconciled with "the fact of a written Constitution" to the extent that it accords "presumptive weight to
the text and original history," id. at 236 (footnote omitted) is, at best, confusing.
Although this analysis suggests an ambivalence or paradox in Brest's approach, I believe that,
taken in its entirety, his thesis does not seriously contemplate a "presumptively binding" notion of
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against the first, more conclusive approach would apply.
The third and fourth approaches to determining the appropriate
weight to assign to the Constitution's historical context must be analyzed in comparison to each other. Ultimately, the reasons which make
the fourth approach unacceptable explain why the third should be
adopted. Recall that the third approach accords the historical context
no special importance as a standard for constitutional interpretation,
while the fourth approach would treat the historical context as irrelevant to contemporary constitutional interpretation. According to the
strongest version of the historical context-as-irrelevant approach, the
historical materials should 4 ' never be taken into account because they
represent the conclusions of a prior generation-conclusions which cannot have true significance for the world of today and to which we have
not, in any meaningful sense, consented. 14 6 Weaker versions might argue, for example, that historical context is relevant in cases implicating
the structure of, and relationship between, governmental institutions
but not in cases implicating individual rights; or that historical context
should be relevant only when interpreting the so-called specific or
"housekeeping" constitutional provisions; or that it should be ignored
where it conflicts with longstanding and accepted institutional practices
7
or settled judicial interpretations.'
But what are we to make of the claim that the Constitution's historical context is irrelevant? Could we understand it to suggest that the
Court has no responsibility to consider the historical record to provide
affirmative support for its decisions, or at least for purposes of defending them? At least as a descriptive matter, such a suggestion would
appear to be inconsistent with what courts do. We may criticize, for
example, the accuracy of a judge's historical conclusions, or we may
suspect the judge is manipulating historical materials to support a con-

the Constitution's historical context. Instead, it seems to treat the historical context as one relevant and perhaps inherent feature of reasoning about constitutional law. Later in this section, I
shall sketch and defend such an approach. See infra notes 145-217 and accompanying text.
145. 1 say "should" instead of "could" although, as a descriptive matter, I believe the historical context is an inherent aspect of constitutional reasoning. As a normative proposition I also
believe that the historical context plays an important role. See infra notes 163-76 and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., Miller, Separationof Powers, supra note 139, at 584 ("framers' intentions,"
even if ascertainable, "are irrelevant to the decision of modern constitutional problems."). Cf.
Brest, supra note 100, at 225 ("We did not adopt the Constitution, and those who did are dead
and gone."); Grano, supra note 30, at 58 ("By seeking to bind subsequent generations, the founders arguably exceeded the bounds of their authority.").
147. Munzer & Nickel, supra note 99, at 1054 ("[S]ome historical appeals that ignore the
development our Constitution has undergone may actually themselves be unfaithful to the Constitution of the United States.").
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clusion reached on other grounds,"1 8 but we would be hard-pressed to
find a judge who contends (at least publicly) that the Constitution's
historical context is irrelevant. This is not to say that every opinion in a
constitutional case will explicitly discuss the Constitution's historical
context: prominent majority and dissenting opinions have often been
devoid of such discussions.1 49 Often, courts may primarily rely upon an
interpretation of precedents which have, at least at some point, been
formally connected to the text and its historical setting.150 But even in
those Supreme Court cases which have presented the most serious controversies with respect to the historical context, the Court has defended
its decisions as consistent with its understanding of that context.151
Just as judges continue to recognize the importance of historical
materials, so do academic theorists. It is significant that, despite the
intractable problems inherent in the concept of the "framers' intent" 1 '6-problemswhose dimensions have long been understood-even
those constitutional theorists who support expansive interpretations of
individual rights continue to treat the "framers' intent" as an essential

148. In almost every case in which different judges claim that the historical record compels
(or at least permits) different conclusions, critics will suspect that at least one of them is guilty of
manipulation or worse. See supra note 106, discussing Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690
(1982), and accompanying text. However, unless there is complete agreement on the relevant
historical materials and on the clarity and completeness of the historical record-conditions which
will seldom, if ever, be met-multiple interpretations are inevitable. Any suggestion that interpretive good faith requires (or even permits) complete agreement is surely simplistic.
149. 1 am not suggesting that the precise relevance of the Constitution's historical context-that is, the extent to which the justices consider it in reaching their decisions-will always
be demonstrable from their opinions. For example, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964), the Court, in holding that the first amendment immunized much defamatory speech
from government regulation, placed considerable importance upon the view that the Sedition Act
of 1798 was also unconstitutional. Although that Act has never been challenged in the Supreme
Court, the Court in Sullivan opined that "the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the
court of history." Id. at 276. Reviewing statements and events which were all made after the
adoption of the Bill of Rights, the Court concluded that there was a "broad consensus that the
Act . . . was inconsistent with the First Amendment." Id. One searches the Court's opinion in
vain to find any explicit attempt to support its decision by reasoning from the Constitution's historical context. Indeed, the Court cited Leonard Levy's comprehensive analysis of the history of
the first amendment, a book in which the author concluded that "freedom of speech and press...
was not understood to include a right to broadcast sedition by words." Id. at 273 (quoting L.
LEvy, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 237 (1960)). But see Levy, Liberty of the Press from Zenger to
Jefferson. in L. LEVY, JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 137-38
(1972).
150. Professors Munzer and Nickel have contended that a constitutional decision is legitimate "when there is an interpretation of the text, or a chain of interpretations at least one of
which is eventually tied to the text, which yields the rule or decision." Munzer & Nickel, supra
note 99, at 1054. It has been suggested, for example, that even Roe v. Wade might plausibly be
interpreted in this way. Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its
Critics, 53 B.U.L. REV. 765 (1973).
151. See, e.g.. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 422-23 (1934).
152. See supra notes 107-24 and accompanying text.

Published by eCommons, 1982

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 8:3

element of constitutional discourse. 153 For example, Professor Grey, the
progenitor of noninterpretivism, acknowledged that, to be imbued with
lawful authority, noninterpretive judicial review must be supported in
terms of "the conventional and accepted categories of legal argument,"
including the original understanding itself.15 ' Grey went on to seek a
justification for noninterpretivism in the intellectual and jurisprudential
environment in which the framers lived.155 Similarly, David Richards,
an advocate of a broad conception of freedom of expression and individual privacy, has defended modern cases that expanded constitutional
protections as consistent with a contractarian theory which had "historic significance. . . in the minds of those who established the constitutional order."'" Even Professor White who has contended "that
judges have not been and cannot be confined, in their interpretations of
the Constitution, to the explicit words of the constitutional text or to
the original intentions of the framers,"' 57 defends this argument, in
part, on the basis of his interpretation of the "intellectual context of the
constitutional generation"'' 5 8 and his conclusion that "[a] decisive majority of the framers of the Constitution took rights against the state
seriously, thought that the constitutional text was not the sole source of
such rights, and expected that while the rights derived from the people,
they were to be articulated and protected by elites."' 59 And Professor
Miller, who once contended that the "framers' intent" was irrelevant,
went on to qualify that assertion. 60

153. Professor Monaghan has written:
Judicial opinions at least purport to take original intent seriously, apparently reflecting the
belief that the original intent mode is not simply a matter of expository style in opinion
writing. It is, rather, a way of thinking about constitutional 'meaning' that follows from the
basic concepts that legitimate judicial review itself.
Monaghan, supra note 30, at 375 (footnotes omitted). While I disagree with Monaghan's implication that a methodology which treats the Constitution's historical context as dispositive is somehow intrinsic to any defensible approach to constitutional interpretation, I agree emphatically that
consideration of the historical context is an inherent aspect of constitutional reasoning. See infra
notes 166-77 and accompanying text. Moreover, I think this flows not only from considerations of
judicial legitimacy, but from the very nature of constitutionalism itself.
154. Grey, supra note 27, at 715.
155. See Grey, Origins, supra note 30.
156. D.A.J. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CITCISM OF LAw 51 (1977). See Grey, Origins,
supra note 30.
157. White, Reflections on the Role of the Supreme Court: The ContemporaryDebate and
the 'Lessons'ofHistory, 63 JUDICATURE 162, 172 (1979).
158. Id. at 169.
159. Id. at 170.
160. "At best, the intentions, assuming they can be identified, are but one factor among
many in the difficult task of constitutional interpretation." Miller, Separation of Powers. supra
note 139, at 584-85.
In this context, Professor Choper's recent work is also worth noting. In defending his Federalism Proposal, Choper noted than an "axiom of American government is that no matter how
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The fact that leading advocates of expansive interpretations of individual rights feel compelled to defend their conceptions of substantive
doctrine (as well as noninterpretive review itself) in terms of the "framers' intent""" helps illuminate evaluation of the historical context-isirrelevant thesis. It tends to discredit suggestions by intent theorists
that meaningful restraints on interpretive discretion can be found only
in strict adherence to the narrowest conceptions of the "framers' intent." It does so by suggesting that, despite their unwillingness to be
bound by the framers' values, noninterpretive theorists accept the significance of historical argument as a stabilizing and even restraining
influence on the development of constitutional doctrine and theory.
Moreover, it suggests how deeply entrenched historical justification has
become as an essential element in acceptable constitutional discourse
by expressing the minimum currency necessary for professional
credibility.
I do not suggest that the stabilizing or restraining influence of the
more conceptual or generalized forms of historical analysis can be demonstrably proven in particular cases. As with other forms of legal reasoning, historical analysis can be fabricated, or it can be undertaken at
so abstract a level as to have minimal or even no persuasive force in
connecting contemporary doctrine to historically plausible foundations. 162 However, recognition of the relevance (if not essentiality) of
historical support for proffered doctrine at least implies that some positions cannot plausibly be defended.
In this sense, historical analysis provides much the same restraining and legitimizing influence on doctrinal development as do the
doctrines of precedent and stare decisis. While those doctrines are also
subject to manipulation-note Professor Monaghan's observation that
"stare decisis is simply an unwelcome nuisance for the commentators
whose concerns center upon the outer boundaries and expanding terri-

sound, laudable, or expedient a reasoned constitutional thesis may be, it must fail if it is contradicted by the clear intention of the framers." J. CHOPER, supra note 19, at 241. Without attempting a comprehensive analysis of the "framers' intent," he noted that certain historical data seemed
at least to shed some doubt on the historical validity of his proposal. Ultimately, however, he
concluded that "the historical evidence on the particular issue of original intent is sufficiently
ambiguous to allow us to proceed without attempting the onerous task of plowing this field." Id. at
242. For criticism of Choper's use of the "framers' intent," see Saphire, Book Review, 6 U. DAYTON L. REV. 359 (1981).
161. There are, to be sure, important exceptions. See, e.g., Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 223 (1981); Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal
Constitutionalism. 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 411 (1981). Professor Perry also does not try to justify his
conception of constitutional doctrine as compelled by the Constitution's historical context. Indeed,
his purpose is to demonstrate that much contemporary constitutional doctrine can be justified even
though it cannot find affirmative support in the 'framers' intent." M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 24.
162. See. e.g.. Sandalow, supra note 1,at 1046; Saphire, supra note 56, at 316-20.
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tories of constitutional law," 163 -they can and do have the effect of
disciplining judicial reasoning as well as facilitating a system of doctrinal development which, at a minimum, accounts for the continuing
value of prior decisions.1 64 Moreover, despite reservations expressed
earlier, 16 historical analysis may provide a focus for evaluation which
other modes of analysis-such as the "judge's own values"--cannot.
Where a court completely misreads the historical record, critical commentary and1 6appellate review may effectively (and rationally) modify
its mistakes.
These observations, I believe, suggest a more elemental reason for
rejecting the thesis that the Constitution's historical context is irrelevant in constitutional adjudication. It is, I believe, logically implausible
and rationally unintelligible to contend that contemporary consideration of any idea can take place in an historical vacuum. Our ability to
understand and evaluate the world in which we live is ineluctably determined by our understanding of the past. When, for example, we seek
to understand the physical universe, we must do so within a conceptual
framework inherited from our predecessors. Although we strive for new
understandings-for different, more comprehensive and thus more satisfying conceptions of truth-we must begin with the artifacts created
by others. The language we use and the concepts we employ are not, at
least initially, of our own creation. We must first understand the concepts and explanations offered by our predecessors before we can begin
to examine and make sense of the world for ourselves. It is by testing
earlier ideas-by assessing their durability against the passing of time
and our own experience-that we seek a deeper and fuller understanding of our world. 17

163. Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously. 39 MD. L. REV. 1, 4-5
(1979). See also Maltz, Some Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law,
1980 Wis. L. REV. 467.
164. Cf R. DwORKIN, supra note 30, at 110-23 (discussing the role and value of precedent
in adjudication).
165. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Bork, Comments to Chapter 4, in THE JUDICIARY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 110 (1979):

The question is,how can we control the Court? There have to be some restraints upon an
institution of that nature in a democratic society. The only source of discipline I can think
of, as long as we accept, as we do, the legitimacy of judicial review, is informed professional criticism of the Court.
Id. at 113. See also Bork, The Struggle Over the Role of the Court, NAT'L REV. Sept. 17, 1982;
Saphire, The Value of The Brethren: A Response to Its Critics (Book Review), 58 TEX. L. REV.
1475 (1980).

167. Cf T.

KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS

(2d ed. 1970). Holmes'

observation eloquently expresses the significance of this process for legal analysis:
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their
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In this regard, consider Professor Alexander's observations on how
we develop our personal values:
People come to have the values they do because of influence: the influence of their parents, the influence of the church to which their parents
sent them, the influence of the schools that they were forced to attend,
the influence of their relatives, friends, and neighbors, the influence of
writers, and the influence of multitudes of others.10 8
As Alexander notes, the development of our personal values takes place
as we react to the milieu in which we are born and in which we must
live. It is only by coming to understand the values held by those who
have preceded us and those who now constitute our environment, and
by understanding the reasons others offer in support of their values,
that we are able to determine which we should embrace and which we
should discard. Where the values of those around us explain and confirm the feelings and intuitions we draw from our own experience, we
will accept them and adopt them as our own. When our own feelings
and intuitions cannot be reconciled with the values accepted by those
around us, our instinct will be to reject them and search for ones which
are more harmonious and thus more satisfying. The influence exerted
by our environment on the formulation of our personal values will invariably be gradual and even subconscious. Ultimately, we may be unable
to distinguish between the values of others and those we embrace ourselves. But this is not because our own values have been predetermined.
Rather, it is because we have come independently to accept them as
1 89
our own.
It seems to me that we determine our public values in much the

fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by
which men should be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's development
through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and
corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to know what it is, we must know what it
has been, and what it tends to become.
O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW I (1881). See Friedrich, Law and History. 14 VAND. L. REV.
1027, 1029-39 (1961).
168.

Alexander, Liberalism and Neutral Dialogue: Man and Manna in the Liberal State,

28 UCLA L. REV. 816, 854 (1981) (emphasis in original).
169. It certainly is not the case that all persons enjoy the same degree of freedom and
independence in developing a system of personal values. Some persons, for example, may be denied independence because of mental disability. Others may be dominated or coerced by others in
ways which either undermine their freedom to choose values or which limit the objectivity of
choice. For example, children may be unable to freely determine their personal values due to
parental domination, intellectual immaturity, and limited experience. See generally B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 121-24, 146-54 (1980). It does seem clear, however,
that our society at least professes a deep commitment to maximizing the individual's freedom to
pursue his or her own conception of the good. See, e.g., Dworkin & Magee, Three Concepts of
Liberalism, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 14, 1979, at 41.
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same way. Each generation inherits from its predecessors a system of
values pertaining to governmental structures and processes and to governmental-individual relations. The values of one generation necessarily
influence those of its successors by providing the context against which
its successors' values will be determined. In determining its values,
each generation explores those of its predecessors, probing them for
their underlying justifications and historical roots.1 70 Like a child seeking guidance from its parents, each generation seeks confirmation of its
own "feelings" or "intuitions" in the judgment of the past. But the
most important determinant of each generation's values lies in its own
experience. The values of the past have no necessary claim on the present. Where they are found to be sufficiently vibrant to meet the needs
of later generations, they will be embraced for that reason. Where they
do not, they will be rejected. As with individuals reacting to their environment, the influence of one generation upon the values of another
will be gradual. Where prior values endure, their origin may become
ambiguous.
And so it is with constitutional law. The Constitution plays a central role in the development of our public values. We live within a
framework of institutions and modes of governmental-individual interactions which were established by our predecessors and expressed in a
written Constitution. The Constitution's special significance derives
from the fact that it represents the culmination of the nation's birth.
(Similarly, the Reconstruction-era amendments represent the culmination of the nation's rebirth). It reflected and embodied at least a general consensus of seminal political values and attracted widespread endorsement and consent. As our society has become dramatically more
complicated and diverse, the search for broadly-shared values has become more illusive. Under these conditions, the values embraced by our
constitutive generation have continued to exert an important influence
on our world. But, as noted before, that influence is not inherently
dominating. Instead, as we struggle to find answers to the important
questions of our time, we inevitably seek guidance from the answers
170. Where the constitutional text and other historical materials do not clearly resolve the
issue in question, it is often said that courts should consider the "purposes" for which a provision
was enacted or the "evils" with which the framers purported to deal. See. e.g.. Home Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 427 (1934); J.ELY, supra note 113, at 13; Grano, supra.
note 30, at 66; Monaghan, supra note 30, at 363. Once these purposes are fully understood, it is
supposed that the "framers' specific intent" with respect to contemporary analogues of the
problems they confronted can be discerned. However, in probing for the framers' broad purposes,
we cannot realistically expect to discover their "specific intentions." Instead, we can seek a deeper
understanding of the reasons they offered in support of their values. This understanding permits us
to make more intelligent decisions concerning the relevance of their values to the problems which
we confront.
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our constitutive generation gave to the questions of its own.
Consider, in this regard, Dean Sandalow's characterization of the
relationship between the framers' thinking and our own:
Constitutional values are not born of the moment; they have a history
that must be understood if they are to be realized. Our circumstances
are perceived in part through the lensa of earlier valuations and our aspirations are in part shaped by them. 11
Sandalow further noted:
Concepts were formulated that became not merely the lens through
which succeeding generations have viewed the world, but the material
from which they have fashioned solutions to the problems they have confronted. It is not surprising, then, that we turn to these periods, perhaps
more than to others, in the effort to give structure to our aspirations, to
determine the meaning that we ought to give to the Constitution. The
search, however, is not for knowledge of the precise accommodation of
competing values achieved by the framers, in order that we may somehow deduce the answer to current problems from it, but for a better
understanding of the choices that must now be made and of the risks
attendant upon alternative solutions. In this way, we draw upon the past,
not for answers, but for guidance in coping with the problems that now
17
confront us.

3

Sandalow's observations eloquently capture the inexorable influence
history has on the development of constitutional law. When judges
search for the Constitution's meaning, they seek to define those rights
which our political-legal system expresses its preparedness to respect.
In determining these rights, the judge must examine the constitutional
texts and prior decisions which have interpreted them. She must also
plumb the legal, political, and moral history in which the Constitution
was formed and throughout which it has been given meaning. In this
process, history is not an isolated phenomenon independent of and external to the present. It does not constrain or rigidly limit constitutional analysis. Instead, as Professor Dworkin has noted, history constitutes a necessary ingredient of legal interpretation; it "is part of the
judgment about the rights of an individbackground that any plausible
173
ual must accommodate."

171. Sandalow, supra note 1, at 1039 (footnote omitted).
172. Id. at 1070.
173. R. DwoRKIN, supra note 30, at 87.
Stanley Fish's conception of the way in which historical analysis is integrated into legal interpretation may help elucidate the point which I make in the text. Fish argues that Dworkin's
notion of history as an ingredient, rather than a constraint, on the political judgment of judges
highlights, rather than avoids, the problem of judicial discretion which Dworkin seeks to circumvent. Noting Dworkin's claim that the judge must "accommodate" his decision with the back-
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The history that forms the ingredient of constitutional interpretation is not confined to the events and ideas surrounding the promulgation of the constitutional texts. There are, to be sure, occasions in
which the history pertaining to the formulation of constitutional provisions will be accorded special and even crucial importance. As Professor Monaghan has noted, "it would be an intuitive, widely shared premise that the supreme court in 1800 should have accorded interpretive
primacy to original intent in ascertaining the 'meaning' of the constitution." 7 Although the notion is controversial, it does not seem implausible to suppose that, in the immediate aftermath of the Constitution's
creation, the values and experiences of our society generally were congruent with those of the framers. Moreover, even as time progresses,
where we perceive an essential identity or harmony between their values and our own it is only natural that we should give formal expression to that fact; by doing so, we confirm and strengthen our own beliefs. However, while the values of the constitutive generation can lend
important support to our convictions, they cannot, in any mechanical
sense, determine or control them. Those values were directed to a
world much different from our own; our world has been shaped more
directly by our own experience. As Professor Bickel once noted:
[A]s time passes, fewer and fewer relevantly decisive choices are to be
divined out of the tradition of our founding. Our problems have grown
radically different from those known to the Framers, and we have had to
make value choices that are effectively new, while maintaining continuity
with tradition. Anything that might still properly be called 'construction'
75
of the written Constitution has come to suffice less and less.1

ground institutional history, Fish argues: "With the word 'accommodate' what had been inseparable suddenly falls
apart, for it suggests that rather than having his judgment informed by the
history (in the sense that his ways of thinking are constrained by it) the judge takes an independent look at an independent history and decides (in a movement of perfect freedom) to accommodate it; it suggests, in short, that he could have chosen otherwise." Fish, Working on the Chain
Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 551, 566 n.23 (1982)(commenting
on Dworkin. Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527 (1982)). Fish advances the following
relationship between history and (legal) interpretation:
[Olne can be faithful to legal history only by revising it, by redescribing it in such a way as
to accommodate and render manageable the issues raised by the present. This is a function
of the law's conservatism, which will not allow a case to remain unrelated to the past, and
so assures that the past, in the form of the history of decisions, will be continually
rewritten.
Id. at 558 (footnote omitted). I am not certain whether it makes more sense to say that the judge
interprets the legal history in light of the issue presented by the case or whether it necessarily
works the other way around. In any event, 1, with Fish, find it hard to imagine a constitutional
decision which has no relationship to the Constitution's historical context, as well as previous
decisions.
174. Monaghan, supra note 30. at 375 (footnote omitted)(emphasis in original).
175. A. BICKEL, supra note 52, at 39.
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Because our world is so different from the framers', our value
choices will not always be identical to theirs. Where we adhere or recommit ourselves to their values, it will be because the experience of
subsequent generations, including our own, will have demonstrated
their enduring vitality. 7 "The question," as Dean Sandalow has noted,
"is not simply what the framers thought, but what has become of their
ideas in the time between their age and ours."177
And so it would seem that the thesis that the Constitution's historical context has no relevance to contemporary constitutional interpretation must be rejected. But so must those which assign either conclusive
or even presumptive weight to the historical context. The thesis which
remains regards the Constitution's historical context as a relevant factor in constitutional interpretation, but one which is neither conclusively nor presumptively dispositive. According to this view, the weight
to be accorded the historical context would be determined by analysis
of a number of factors. These include: (1) the interpreter's confidence
in her historical conclusions in light of the state of the historical record
and her confidence in her resolution of the methodological dilemmas
previously discussed;17 8 (2) an assessment of the values which the pro-

176. It has sometimes been suggested that the "specific intentions of the framers" constitute
an irreducible "core meaning" which should be treated as inviolable. See, e.g., SUPREME COURT
AND SUPREME LAW 63 (E. Cahn ed. 1954) (comments of J.P. Frank). In rejecting this suggestion,
Dean Sandalow hypothesizes a case in which the Court was asked to interpret the first amendment to permit a prior restraint on publication. His observation bears repeating here:
No doubt it is true that the Supreme Court would, if the issue were posed at the present
term, invalidate legislation licensing printing presses or authorizing the use of torture to
extract confessions. But these and similar hypothetical cases . . . pose issues with respect
to which our values coincide with those of the framers. For many such issues, indeed, the
development of our values over the course of nearly two centuries has been in the direction
of strengthening belief in the wisdom of the framers' intentions. In consequence, we have
lacked impetus to develop intellectual foundations that would permit us to depart from
those intentions. Not only do we lack such foundations, but because of the coincidence of
our values and what we apprehend as the 'core meaning,' our sympathies lie with theories
that promise to insulate that meaning from depredation by those who someday may wish to
depart from it. It is understandable that in these circumstances it should seem 'unthinkable' that the courts would depart from the 'core meaning' of the Constitution.
Sandalow, supra note I, at 1062 (footnote omitted). For an earlier and similar rejection of the
"core meaning" notion, see Wofford, supra note 113. at 520-22.
177. Sandalow, supra note I, at 1070.
178. Supra notes 107-24 and accompanying text.
Where the historical record is especially unclear or fragmented, judges should be especially
dubious in claiming that their decision is required by the Constitution's historical context. (Note
that the historical neutrality of one's conclusion with respect to the clarity and completeness of
historical materials may itself be suspect). Such claims can only be regarded with suspicion by
critics. See, e.g.. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982) (discussed supra note 106). Instead,
both the efficacy of the decision and the Court's own credibility would be better served by conceding the equivocal nature of the historical materials and seeking to justify the decision candidly by
explicit reference to other factors. For example, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
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vision was designed to further; (3) prior authoritative interpretations of
other branches of government; 7 9 (4) contemporary understandings and
attitudes concerning the issue in question; and (5) considerations of social justice and welfare.18 0 These factors are, to a significant extent,
overlapping. And, of course, there is no way to specify the precise
weight each should be assigned in a particular case. For example, the
more specific the constitutional language, the more reluctance there

U.S. 555 (1980), Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion concluded that the first amendment
guaranteed both the public and the press a right to attend criminal trials. In part, Burger relied
upon an historical analysis which began in "the days before the Norman Conquest," continued on
through the colonial period in America and concluded with an examination of events and commentary in the 19th century through the present day. Id. at 564-69. Obviously feeling bound to
demonstrate support for his conclusion in the "framers' intent," and apparently being unable to
find credible evidence of the framers' specific thinking, Burger confined himself to the following
observation:
The Bill of Rights was enacted against the backdrop of the long history of trials being
presumptively open. Public access to trials was then regarded as an important aspect of the
process itself. . . . In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the First
Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as to give
meaning to those explicit guarantees ...
Id. at 575 (emphasis added).
It seems to me that this analysis is much more cogent than one which would have purported
to be compelled by the Constitution's historical context. But see, e.g., Bevier, Like Mackerel in
the Moonlight: Some Reflections on Richmond Newspapers, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv. 311, 325
(1982)("[Tlhe opinion itself merely invokes history: It gives no reasons why historical practice
qua historical practice is the appropriate source of a constitutional right of access to criminal
trials."). Burger invoked history in a way which: (I) made a plausible case for the notion that had
the framers considered the issue, they would have opted for open criminal trials; (2) made a
plausible argument that the value of openness in criminal proceedings has retained its vitality
through much of our subsequent history, a fact which provides confirmation of its enduring vitality as a public value; and (3) provides at least plausible support for the notion that the Court was
not simply making its own assessment of the value of openness and enforcing it against the states
as a matter of constitutional law. Of course, this does not mean that decisions which invoke history in this way should be accepted uncritically. If, for example, available historical materials had
supported the practice of closure, one might have expected from the plurality an especially forceful demonstration that subsequent developments and understandings militate against a contemporary decision to that effect.
179. Authoritative interpreters include not only judges, but also Congress. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974)
(noting that interpretations of the Constitution by the executive branch are entitled to "great

respect."). See generally G.

GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS

25-31

(10th ed. 1980); Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). Moreover, the decisions of state officials have been presumed to
be predicated upon their independent interpretation of the Constitution and thus, pursuant to
article VI and prudential considerations, entitled to deference. For a discussion of the role that.
nonjudicial interpreters might play in constitutional change, see Munzer & Nickel, supra note 99,
at 1055-61.
180. For helpful discussions of the relevance and interrelationship of these kinds of considerations, see Greenawalt, Policy, Rights and Judicial Decision. II GA. L. REV. 991 (1977);
Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 4 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 645, 729-37 (1980); tenBroek,
Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction, 27
CALIF.

L.

REV.

399 (1939).
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may be to move beyond its literal meaning. But even where the language is relatively specific, an increased willingness to give it (and its
meaning) particularly significant weight should not be based on a sense
of blind obedience to the framers' will. Instead, it might be based on
the notion that constitutional interpretation must at least begin with
the text itself. Where the language of the text is generally perceived as
concise and unambiguous, the interpretive factors described in the preceding paragraph are more likely to converge on a single meaning..
Take, for example, the requirement of article I that a United
States Senator be thirty years of age. Due to the constancy of mathematical language, there will be little question of linguistic or historical
ambiguity. Moreover, the absence of prior authoritative interpretations
will remove much of the "historical gloss" which has been thought to
complicate interpretation of other provisions."" Furthermore, concerns
of social welfare and justice are not immediately suggested by the age
requirement in question. This is not to say, however, that at some future time the senatorial age requirement might not plausibly be
deemed ambiguous, nor that it might not be interpreted in a nonliteral
sense. For example, if future developments in genetic engineering or
the psychological sciences result in significant acceleration of the pace
of physical and intellectual maturity, an assertion that the textual requirement of thirty years should be understood as a symbolic reference
to maturity might be regarded as warranting serious consideration. To
be sure, an assessment of the Constitution's historical context in such a
case might exert significant restraint on authoritative interpreters who
may choose to defer to tradition and a sincere respect for the framers'
wisdom. However, I do not find persuasive the notion that the Court
would be overstepping its legitimate function in constitutional interpretation if it were, in the future, to hold that a twenty-nine-year-old is
eligible for election to the Senate.'
This analysis would also hold with respect to other constitutional
provisions which generally have not been regarded as inherently ambiguous or open-ended. Even in such instances, there may be compelling
reasons for moving beyond the literal meaning that the language initially suggests. For example, article II reads, in relevant part, as follows: "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four
Years . . . ." A literal interpretation of this provision suggests that the

181. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952)(Frankfuner, J., concurring).
182. For further discussion of the possibility of how interpretations which now seem off-thewall might become respectable, see infra note 217.
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use of the word "he" limits eligibility for the presidency to men.""a This
interpretation is supported by subsequent references in article II to the
President as "him. '1 s4 However, doubt is raised by the fact that provisions of article II also refer to the President as "person." 18 5 In order to
resolve the apparent linguistic ambiguity, accepted canons of interpretation would suggest inquiry into the "framers' intent." According to

most traditional versions of intent theory, analysis would focus initially
on the meaning the framers attributed to "he" and "person." Was "he"
used in a symbolic sense, to personify all individuals, regardless of gender? Was "person" used as a gender-neutral term? Assuming this inquiry proved inconclusive, the interpreter might next focus on the framers' broader "intentions." For example, what was the social and
political status of women at the time? Does the fact that women were
generally excluded from the franchise suggest an intention to disqualify
them from eligibility to public office in general? To high national office, including the presidency? Although I have not undertaken an independent analysis of this issue, it would be quite surprising to learn
that the framers had a specific "intention" that women would be qualified for the presidency.'" And although historical analysis might reveal

that they did not even consider the question-and therefore had, at
that time, no specific intention in the matter-the political and economic subserviency which characterized the status of women at the
time of the framing of the original Constitution and the Civil War
Amendments 81 would suggest that had the framers actually considered

183. The plausibility of this interpretation might be enhanced by contrasting this provision
with § 3 of article I which, in prescribing the minimum senatorial age, provides that "[n]o
[Piersonshall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years," U.S. CONsT.
ART. I, 53 (emphasis added), thus at least implying that the framers were conscious of the narrower meaning of the word "he." Similarly, article i, § 2, in providing for the qualifications of
United States Representatives, also refers to "person."
7 (presidential compensation); U.S. CONsT. art.
184. See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. art. !1,§ 1, cl.
2, 3 (presidential powers and responsibilities).
185. See. e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § I, cI. 3.
186. Thomas Jefferson is reported to have said: "Were our state a pure democracy, there
would still be excluded from our deliberations . . . women, who, to prevent depravation of morals
and ambiguity of issues, should not mix promiscuously in gatherings of men"; and "[tihe appointment of a woman to office is an innovation for which the public is not prepared, nor am ." M.
GRUBERG, WOMEN IN AMERICAN PoLITIcs 4 (1968).
Recall, also, Abigail Adams' request to her husband that he "Remember the Ladies" in the
new Code of Laws, and his response which found her request to be amusing. See Kerber, From
the Declaration of Independence to the Declaration of Sentiments: The Legal Status of Women
in the Early Republic 1776-1848. 6 HuM. RTs. 115 (1977) (citing I ADAMS FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE 369-70, 381-83 (L. Butterfield ed. 1965)).
187. Section 2 of the fourteenth amendment, in establishing a system of apportionment of
representatives among the states, provides that where a state denies the right to vote in elections
for various federal officials to "any of the male inhabitants of such State . . .the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall
II,

55
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the issue, they would have understood article I!to exclude women from
presidential eligibility.
At the risk of belaboring the point, how should a contemporary
court resolve this "problem" of constitutional interpretation? At least

prior to the adoption of the nineteenth amendment in 1920,118 a court
which viewed the "framers' intent" as dispositive would have been
compelled to conclude that the Constitution precluded a woman from
election to the presidency.1 ' What effect would the 1954 "incorporation" of equal protection principles into the fifth amendment 90 have
had on the question? Even if a court had concluded that article II must
be read in light of equal protection principles, it is unlikely that it
would have held women qualified. It was not until the 1970's that the
Court abandoned its highly deferential analysis of gender-based classifications."' And in the 1980's? Although the issue may be less clear, it
is difficult to imagine that a court preoccupied with the "framers' intent" would resolve the problem differently. Especially in view of the
recent failure of ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment, it is unlikely that a court would feel free to judicially alter the "original
intent."
But could it seriously be doubted that the present-day Supreme
Court would interpret the Constitution to bar a woman from election to
the presidency?" 2 I think not, and its decision would be fully supported

bear to the whole number of male citizens."

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added).

Despite an occasional suggestion that the fourteenth amendment prohibited sex discrimination in
voting, see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 229 (1970)(Brennan, J., dissenting in part), the fact
that the amendment implicitly tolerates (although not without cost) denial of the franchise to
certain males belies the notion that the framers intended to prohibit discrimination against
women.
188. The nineteenth amendment provides, in part: "The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
sex." U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, cl.
I.
189. Most probably, the nineteenth amendment would not have altered this conclusion. In
express terms, it is confined to the franchise, not eligibility for public office. Given the assumption
that the Constitution disqualified women for the presidency prior to 1920, it is difficult to see how
an intent theorist would accept the argument that the nineteenth amendment changed this result
by indirection.
190. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
191. Compare Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) overruled in Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976)(holding that a Michigan statute which allowed only wives and daughters of owners of liquor establishments to tend bar was a rational classification not in violation of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment) with Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding
that a provision of the Idaho Probate Code which gave preference to men over women for appointment as administrator of a decedent's estate provided dissimilar treatment for men and women
who were similarly situated and thus violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment).
192. To my knowledge, there was no public debate with respect to the constitutional impli-

cations of gender in the recent elevation of Justice O'Connor to the Supreme Court. Article Ill,

Published by eCommons, 1982

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 8:3

by an application of the interpretive factors sketched above. Although
analysis of the constitutional language and its historical context might
suggest a decision disqualifying women, each of the other factors points
in the opposite direction. To the extent that one could identify a
"value" which underlies article II's apparent gender-based limitation
on presidential qualification, among the most likely candidates would
be the view that women are morally inferior to men and/or that women
are not physically and intellectually equipped to hold high public office.
The framers lived in a world in which the woman's role was narrowly
defined. Women were thought not to possess the physical, psychological, and emotional characteristics necessary for responsible and effective participation in political and economic life. Although vestiges of
that perception persist today in some circles, our society now professes
a general commitment to equality of opportunity with respect to-gender. This growing consensus has been reflected in the policy pronouncements and constitutional position of most authoritative interpreters.
Congress has enacted employment discrimination laws prohibiting gender discrimination and has applied those laws to state and federal employees. 193 It has taken similar steps to prohibit sex discrimination in
housing, 19 consumer transactions,1 95 and education.' 9" State and local
governments have enacted similar measures. Similarly, the courts generally have been sensitive to equal-protection-based sex discrimination
claims, referring to attitudes such as those held by the framers as
"archaic and overbroad" generalizations and "increasingly outdated
misconceptions concerning the role of females" in our society.1 97 These
public pronouncements mirror a broadly-held view in our society that
merit should be the primary determinant of social, political, and economic status and that gender is neither an accurate proxy for merit nor
a morally relevant trait.19
Given this analysis, it is difficult to imagine a contemporary court
deciding the hypothesized case in a way which would precisely comport
with the Constitution's historical context.'" It is important to note,

however, makes no reference to gender, nor does article 11's provision for the presidential appointment power.
193. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
194. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
195. 15 U.S.C. §] 1691-91f (1978 & Supp. IV 1980).

196. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
197. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190. 198-99 (1976) (citations omitted).
198. See generally Perry, supra note 70, at 1051-56.
199. It might be contended that a decision holding women constitutionally qualified for the
presidency could in fact be reconciled with intent theory. For example, one could note changed
perceptions concerning the extent to which women are physically and psychologically suited to
conduct themselves "responsibly" in public life. Thus, a court could claim that the "evil" the
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however, that the analysis which I believe a court should apply to such
problems does not ignore the historical context, nor does it regard it as
irrelevant. In addressing contemporary issues, the historical context is a
necessary ingredient of constitutional interpretation. In determining
what the Constitution means today, courts translate into concrete form
our deepest, most abstract public values. In a profound and inescapable
way, our own views with respect to such issues as sexual and racial
equality, permissible forms of officially-sanctioned punishment, and
freedom of expression are the product of the views held by our predecessors. Had the then-perceived values underlying such provisions as
the fourteenth, eighth, and first amendments been significantly different, subsequent conceptions of those values would have evolved
differently.
All constitutional interpreters and theorists understand the mission
of constitutional interpretation as giving meaning to the Constitution.
The fundamental disagreement among theorists is how "the Constitution" is to be properly defined. Interpretivists claim that the Constitution consists exclusively of the textual language, clarified or supplemented by resort to the constitutional structure and the "framers'
specific intentions." Noninterpretivists agree that the constitutional language and structure and the "framers' intent" are primary sources
from which constitutional meaning is to be derived. They believe, however, that these sources are more expansive than interpretivists admit,
requiring courts to discern values whose complete dimensions cannot be
ascertained without reference to social, political, and moral developments which have taken place since the framers' generation and which
continue today. In most cases, noninterpretive theorists point to constitutional provisions, such as the ninth amendment, which cannot plausibly be interpreted without reference to the Constitution's historical
"framers intended" to address by disqualifying women no longer existed and that the framers, if
confronted with the issue today, would have resolved it differently. Alternatively, it could be argued that recognizing public attitudes towards women might change, the "framers intended" to
authorize courts in later generations to resolve the issue differently than they did themselves. Cf.
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 229-36 (1970)(Brennan, J., dissenting in part); L. LUSKY, By
WHAT RIGr? 59-84 (1975); Grano, supra note 30, at 64-75. But these arguments will not work.
In the first place, if the framers did in fact intend to exclude women and did so because of a belief
in their moral inferiority, it is their moral belief that the intent theorist claims must be dispositive,
not our own. See generally R. BERGER, supra note 35. Secondly, theorists who accept the "invitational" approach to the "framers' intent" generally confine that approach to constitutional provisions which are inherently "vague" or "Delphic" or "open-ended," see J. ELY, supra note 113, at
11-41, and article II seems conspicuously inhospitable to such analysis. Moreover, intent theorists
generally reject such an abstracted or generalized approach to intent because it is thought particularly insusceptible to principled limitation. See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems. 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
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context.
I have suggested that the interpretivists' position insists on a conception of the "framers' intent" which is neither logically compelled
nor analytically coherent. The Constitution's historical context, to the
extent that it can be discerned, is an important ingredient of constitutional interpretation. A judge who perceives her task as giving meaning
to the Constitution-and not simply giving legal effect to her own, idiosyncratic belief of what public policy and human rights ought to
be-cannot ignore the historical context any more than she can avoid
consideration of the contemporary moral, social, and political environment in which she lives. The judge will feel "bound" by the Constitution's historical context where it confirms or coalesces with the conclusions suggested by analysis of the constitutional language,
governmental structure, the evolutionary development of our country's
political and moral values, contemporary perceptions of our most
deeply-held public values, and prudential considerations which suggest
both the importance and realizability of judicial action. A judge will
not and should not be bound by the historical context where it is clearly
inconsistent with these conclusions.
The views I have expressed will, no doubt, raise significant
problems for the reader who believes that constitutional interpretation
is or must be the product of a rigidly deductive, historically, and textually bound methodology. How, it may be asked, does the analysis I
have proffered account for the fact that our Constitution is a written
document whose writtenness is crucial to the interpretive process?
Moreover, in what sense can an approach to constitutional interpretation which considers the Constitution's historical context only one
among a variety of relevant factors yield any meaningful restrictions on
judicial discretion? Is not such an approach fundamentally at odds with
the minimal requirements often considered essential to the legitimacy
of judicial review? I recognize that, for many, these questions are rhetorical; those who reject any role for the courts in the development of
constitutional values-those who believe that no defensible conception
of democracy can tolerate the risks associated with judicial power
which goes beyond the mere transplantation of the "framers' specific
value judgments" to our time-will dismiss my suggestions out-ofhand. To these critics, I suppose all one can do is acknowledge the
efficacy of Professor Levinson's observation that none "of the participants in the debates about constitutional theory are going to have their'
minds changed by reading a polemic by a person of another sect."'' s2

200. Levinson, "The Constitution" in American Civil Religion. 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 123,
150. For suggestions that the debate still has some value, see Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural
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But these questions are important. And since I wish to be taken seriously I shall now-albeit briefly-address them.
First, I do not believe that it is accurate to suggest that the Constitution's writtenness has ever been its most crucial or determinative
characteristic. 20 ' Regardless of how reluctant their concessions, most
theorists agree that "the Constitution" has not, at least in modern
times, been understood as strictly limited by its words. Leading interpretivists have not just reconciled themselves to the inevitability of
moving beyond the written text; they have endorsed the practice. Thus,
Chief Justice Burger, certainly no champion of expansive constitutional
interpretation, concluded that despite the Constitution's failure to
"spell out" a guarantee for the right to attend public trials, such a right
was implicit in the first amendment. 202 Similarly, Professor Grano,
while arguing against the enshrinement of "additional morality in the
Constitution," concedes that courts act legitimately when constitutionalizing moral values as long as those values are "fairly inferable from
the document itself."203 These views do not, of course, suggest that the
written nature of the Constitution is or should be unimportant in constitutional decisionmaking; quite the contrary. What they do suggest,
however, is that the process of constitutional interpretation is not exclusively, nor even predominantly, one of determining the "language
meaning" of constitutional words.' " The Constitution consists of more
than text; it constitutes a record of our political history and public values. Constitutional interpretation is the process by which we give contemporary expression-and by which we make our own contribu0
tion-to that record.2
Second, despite my arguments to the contrary, it may be insisted
that my conception of the Constitution's historical context renders it
Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229; Saphire, The Search for Legitimacy in Constitutional Theory: What
Price Purity?, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 335, 373-77 (1981).
201. Perhaps the most dramatic evidence of this proposition can be found in the Court's
holding that the eleventh amendment, which in express terms prohibits the federal judicial power
from extending to suits "commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State," prohibits federal jurisdiction in suits brought by citizens against the state in which
they reside. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I (1890).
202. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). The Chief Justice went
on to observe: "Notwithstanding the appropriate caution against reading into the Constitution
rights not explicitly defined, the Court has acknowledged that certain unarticulated rights are
implicit in enumerated guarantees." Id. at 579. Moreover, and lest it be forgotten, Burger concurred with the judgment of the Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 207 (1973).
203. Grano, supra note 30, at 8.
204. "Language meaning" has been defined as "the sense that a word, phrase or sentence
bears in a given language." Munzer & Nickel, supra note 99, at 1029 n.2.
205. See Fiss, The Supreme Court. 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARv. L. REv. i, 9 (1979) ("The task of the judge is to give meaning to constitutional values,
and he does that by working with the constitutional text, history, and social ideals.").
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inconsequential in constitutional interpretation. It may be that a judge
who is committed to the notion that the "framers' intent" should control his decisions will decide some cases differently than one who understands its relevance in the terms I have suggested. Certainly, we can
point to some Supreme Court decisions where the principal point of
departure between factions on the Court seems to have been the appropriate weight to be assigned to the Constitution's historical context. But
despite the Court's failure to precisely adhere to the historical context
in most areas of constitutional doctrine, that context has seldom, if
ever, been considered inconsequential. Nor is it apparent how it could
be otherwise. Historical analysis has always been understood by judges
as a key ingredient of legal reasoning. Recall Cardozo's description of
the method by which legal principles are developed: In order to determine the "directive force" of a principle, the judge must apply the
"method of evolution" which accounts for the principle's "line of historical development." '12 " Even' where the Constitution's historical context cannot fairly be considered unambiguous or explicit, judges will
seek historical underpinnings for their decisions. As I have noted, such
a grounding is an unavoidable aspect of all legal reasoning, even if not
always articulated in judicial opinions. Moreover, historical grounding
is an important element of judicial legitimacy. Where judges cannot
plausibly (at least when challenged) support their conclusions in histor07
ical terms, their authority will be suspect.1
Relatedly, it might be argued that a commitment to effectuate
even an admittedly ill-defined or illusive conception of the Constitution's historical context would have a salutary effect on judicial review.
Without the blinders imposed by rigid historical analysis, judges will be
free to interpret the Constitution by resorting to such inherently subjective criteria as natural law or visions of enlightened progress.2 0 8 A
judge who conceives her function in terms of discovering the values of
the constitutive generation would, it might be suggested, be less likely
to end up enforcing her own. And, in any event, a perceived obligation
to justify an interpretation as compelled by the Constitution's historical
context might, regardless of how the interpretation was actually
reached, limit the range of interpretations understood as legitimate. 2a "
206. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 30-31 (1921). Cardozo noted
that "[the tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of logic may be counteracted by,
the tendency to confine itself within the limits of its history." Id. at 51.
207. Cf R. DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 87-88 (discussing the requirements of "political
responsibility' and "articulate consistency" as they relate to the judicial decision).
208. See J. ELY, supra note 113, at 43-72; M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 91-96.
209. Thus, even though intent theory may be unable to adequately prescribe a process for
discovering constitutional rights, it may still have important value as a method for justifyinga
court's decisions. For a general discussion of the distinction between processes of discovery and
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Without underestimating the ways in which "historical facts" can be
manipulated, 10 it is apparent that some interpretations of the Constitution could not plausibly be defended as being required by its historical
context.
But even were courts to disavow themselves of the notion that they
must seek out and accord dispositive weight to the Constitution's historical context, it is doubtful that the process of constitutional interpretation would collapse into the nightmare of subjectivity feared by interpretive theorists."' Even if a judge does not perceive herself to be
bound by the Constitution's historical context, she will ordinarily have
internalized a sense of its importance as a result of her participation in
two conceptually related, albeit analytically distinct, communities. As a
member of the broader society, the judge's own values will have been
intimately affected and at least partially determined by those public
values to which society has generally adhered and professed its commitment. " " Those values, in turn, will have been importantly influenced by
society's history and traditions, in whose composition the principles and

justification, see R.

WASSEISTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION 25-38 (1961).
210. At the risk of redundancy, it must again be emphasized that the objectivity of intent
theory is itself suspect. Even if one were to conclude that the records of the framers' deliberations
were both comprehensive and complete, there inevitably would be disagreement with respect to

their adequacy for the determination of the "framers' intent." For example, most commentators
agree that Representative John Bingham of Ohio was a central figure in the formulation of the
fourteenth amendment. But, as Professor Dimond has noted, "commentators credit Bingham with
a variety of purposes." Dimond, supra note 44, at 481. For some, the importance of Bingham's
views for purposes of calculating the "framers' intent" has depended upon perceptions of his intellectual or even rhetorical prowess. See generally id. at 481-94. How a judge can resolve this sort
of issue "objectively" is (at best) not self-evident.
211.

See Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the

Noble Dream, 1 GA. L. REV. 969 (1977).
Not infrequently, the debate in constitutional theory over objectivity and subjectivity is perceived as an all-or-nothing game. There is a supposition that unless constitutional interpretation
can be objectively quantified, unless judges can persuade us that each decision is singularly compelled by the words of the Constitution or its historical context, judicial decisions must be the
product of the judge's personal and idiosyncratic convictions. See generally Braden, The Search
for Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 57 YALE LJ.571 (1948). Indeed, this view is often articulated by the judges themselves. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
But even assuming a sharp distinction between objectivity and subjectivity, but see Nagel, Subjective and Objective. in MORTAL QUESTIONS 196 (1979); S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?
335-36 (1980), 1 agree, with Professor Brest, that " hopes for scientific objectivity in legal interpretation are on a par with the fantasy of a single, objective reading of Hamlet or of Balinese
culture," Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765, 771 (1982) (footnote omitted),
and that it is time to come to terms with the "normative implications of acknowledging the indeterminacies that pervade constitutional adjudication." Id. at 769. See generally Saphire, supra
note 200. For purposes of the discussion in the text, I assume that some level of objectivity is
essential to judicial legitimacy and that methodological frameworks can be evaluated in terms of
their capacity to limit the interpreter's range of discretion.
212. The judge, even if not Hercules, "is likely to value most of the concepts that figure in
the justification of the institutions of his own community." R. DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 128.
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ideas of the framers' generation will have played a significant role.
Moreover, as a member of the institutionalized legal community-what
has been termed the "interpretive community"- 13 -the judge will be
expected to operate within the framework of certain "disciplining
rules"' 14 or shared standards of interpretation which will constrain legal analysis whether or not the judge personally accepts them.' s In
constitutional law, one such rule requires that constitutional decisions
be connected (or at least connectable) to principles or values which
have historical roots .2" As previously noted, a decision can be connected to (or account for) the Constitution's historical context even if it
cannot be said to have been predetermined by it. In a case in which the
judge believes that the historical context is clear, but concludes that
other relevant factors point toward a different decision, she may understand the interpretive rules of the profession to preclude a candid and
explicit rejection of that context. Instead, the judge will attempt to justify her decision by generalizing the historical context, or recasting it at
a higher level of abstraction. 1 7

213. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 744 (1982).
214. See id. at 744-46. For further discussion of characteristics of the judicial system which
constrain judicial discretion, see Deutsch, Harvard's View of the Supreme Court: A Response. 57
TEx. L. REV. 1445 (1979); Greenawalt, Discretion and the Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest
for the Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359 (1975).
215. On the difference between recognizing the existence of an interpretive rule and accepting that rule, see R. DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 50-52.
216. Professor Fiss notes that a disciplining rule, such as the rule that "requires the interpreter to look to history," may itself be disputed. Fiss, supra note 213, at 747. For example, he
notes that "Islome judges or lawyers may. . .deny the relevance of history altogether in constitutional interpretation." Id. (footnote omitted). Fiss states that "[dlisputes of this type pose a
more serious challenge to the idea of objectivity than those over the application of a rule, for such
disputes threaten the source of constraint itself." Id. In what has been termed "[h]is most interesting (and dubious) move," Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 395 (1982), Fiss
claims that the difficulties otherwise posed by such disputes for the principle of objectivity are
undermined by the existence of established, mediating procedures, "for example, pronouncements
by the highest court and perhaps even legislation and constitutional amendments." Fiss, supra
note 213, at 747.
Although judges and lawyers may, in fact, disagree on the precise weight assignable to historically isolatable and determinable principles, none-including Professor Brest (whom Fiss cites,
id. at 747 n.19)-deny the "relevance of history altogether in constitutional interpretation." Id. at
747 (footnote omitted). See supra notes 148-60 and accompanying text. Consequently, his concern
that the constraints inherent in historical reasoning might be threatened seems unnecessary.
217. At a more general level, the notion of an interpretive community helps explicate Dean
Sandalow's assertion that, even where the "framers' intent" plays a less formally confining role in
constitutional interpretation, constitutional provisions "cannot be employed to justify any result
toward which we might be inclined at a particular moment." Sandalow, supra note I, at 1054.
The influence of interpretive communities on textual interpretation has been most forcefully
elaborated by the literary critic, Stanley Fish. See S. FISH, supra note 211. Fish rejects the notion
that a text embodies an objective content with determinate meaning subject to a singularly "correct" interpretation. He argues that the interpreter plays an inherently active and even creative
role in textual interpretation, but that recognition of this fact need not commit one to a system of
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As conceived in this article, constitutional interpretation is not a

pure subjectivity in which there are as many interpretations as interpreters, none of which is more
plausible or valid than another. All interpretation is constrained-and to that extent made objective-by the rules of the interpretive community within which it takes place. Those who work
within and constitute the relevant community share certain standards or rules which govern the
interpretive process and which establish a "publicly available system of intelligibility," "a set of
conventional notions which when put into operation constitute in turn a conventional, and conventionally seen, object." Id. at 332. Each member of a given interpretive community will have internalized a set of shared understandings-"interests and goals that are the particular property of no
one in particular but which link everyone for whom their assumption is so habitual as to be unthinking," id. at 320-which will, at any given time, operate to exclude from the realm of plausible interpretations those which are "ridiculous" or "off-the-wall."
Professor Owen Fiss has argued, with considerable force, that interpretation of legal texts is
constrained by the disciplining rules of the legal interpretive community in a way which answers
the nihilists' claim that constitutional interpretation cannot "achieve the measure of objectivity
required by the idea of law." Fiss, supra note 213, at 744. He argues that:
In law the interpretive community is a reality. It has authority to confer because membership does not depend on agreement. Judges do not belong to an interpretive community as
a result of shared views about particular issues or interpretations but belong by virtue of a
commitment to uphold and advanc4 the rule of law itself. They belong by virtue of their
office. There can be many schools of literary interpretation, but . . . in legal interpretation
there is only one school and attendance is mandatory. All judges define themselves as members of this school and must do so in order to exercise the prerogatives of their office. Even
if their personal commitment to the rule of law wavers, the rule continues to act on judges;
even if the rule of law fails to persuade, it can coerce. Judges know that if they relinquish
their membership in the interpretive community, or deny its authority, they lose their right
to speak with the authority of the law.
Id. at 746-47.
Although an extensive evaluation of the Fish-Fiss analysis is beyond the scope of this essay, it
does seem to me that a realization that judges work within an interpretive community with operative, publicly available, and established interpretive rules (e.g., the requirements that constitutional interpretations be connected to, explained, and defended in terms of constitutional language, history, and structure; that courts are bound to explain and defend decisions in terms of
precedent; that decisions comport with deeply and broadly rooted notions of social welfare and
justice) suggests that those individuals invested with judicial authority are simply not free to give
the Constitution any meaning which pleases their personal preferences and biases. The free-spirited judge who, for example, concluded today that the Constitution required a socialist economy
would, notwithstanding his passionate disillusionment with capitalism, simply not be taken seriously. (Although, of course, no such restraint applies to legal commentators. See Tushnet, The
Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism. 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 411, 424 (1981)). The reaction such an
interpretation would elicit would not be simply of the "that-sort-of-thing-just-isn't-done" variety;
it would be a rejection, within the interpretive community, of the very notion that such an interpretation had any claim to authority.
This is not to say, however, that a constitutional interpretation which would today be consensually regarded as off-the-wall could never stake a plausible claim to respectability. Cf S. FISH,
supra note 211, at 345 (discussing the way in which interpretive canons of acceptability can
change). In this regard, compare Justice Miller's doubts, expressed in 1873, that the equal protec-
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process by which courts scrutinize the text of the Constitution, searching for a meaning which is somehow fixed in, or determined by, the
words of the document as they were perceived in the framers' generation. Instead, constitutional interpretation is a process in which courts
give meaning to the Constitution by reference to the constitutional
texts, the principles and ideas which generated those texts, the historical gloss which prior interpretations have imposed upon the texts, and
considerations of social justice and welfare which imbue the texts with
contemporary relevance. I have not attempted to suggest formulae for
determining the precise weight or significance each of these considerations should be given in particular cases, partly because of my doubt
that any formulae can be coherently articulated or consistently applied.
Moreover, the very notion of a methodology which purports to attach
predetermined weight to the interpretive factors which courts have traditionally employed suggests the image of a Constitution whose answers passively await the interpreter-an image which I reject.
When the Constitution is invoked in an attempt to resolve contemporary political-moral issues-particularly those pertaining to the
rights of individuals against the state-the individual and governmental
litigants generally present to the court two alternative interpretations of
the constitutional text. Where the interpretation proffered by the individual litigant is so completely unique that it can claim no significant
foundation in the constitutional text, history, Supreme Court precedent,
and social morality, the disciplining rules of the interpretive community
will operate to dismiss it at the early stages of the litigation process.
Such a claim will not be understood as being made properly in the
name of the Constitution.""' Although it is possible to imagine a consti-

tion clause would ever extend beyond racial discrimination, The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873), with the modern equal protection jurisprudence reflected in recent Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982) (invalidating a Texas statute
that discriminated against illegal aliens); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 102 S. Ct. 3331
(1982) (invalidating a Mississippi statute that discriminated on the basis of sex).
For further elaboration of Professor Fish's thesis in the context of legal interpretation, see
Fish, supra note 173; Fish, Interpretationand the Pluralist Vision, 60 TEx. L. REv. 495 (1982).
For criticism of the Fish thesis, see, e.g., Crews, Criticism Without Constraint, COMMENTARY,
Jan. 1982, at 65; Graff, Culture and Anarchy (Book Review), NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 14, 1981, at
36; Knapp and Michaels, Against Theory, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 723, 736-42 (1982). For a sharply
contrasting approach to textual interpretation, see E. HIRSCH, THE AIMS OF INTERPRETATION
(1976); E. HIRSCH, VAIDITY IN INTERPRETATION (1967). For criticism of Professor Fiss' use of,
the concept of interpretive communities, see Levinson, supra note 216. An approach to interpretation which, in significant respects, seems compatible with Fiss', can be found in Schauer, supra
note 56, at 828-31.
218. It might be suggested that, since the significance of a claim's foundation in text, history, precedent, etc., will often be debatable, a judge bent on deciding a case purely on the basis of
her own personal preferences could imbue her decision with legitimacy simply by referring to a
constitutional provision and including "supporting" references to historical materials, prior court
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tutional lawyer pressing such a claim, it is far more difficult to imagine
a court accepting it. As Professor Fish has noted: "Interpreters are constrained by their tacit awareness of what is possible and not possible to
do, what is and is not a reasonable thing to say, and what will and will
not be heard as evidence, in a given enterprise; and it is within those
same constraints that they see and bring others to see the shape of the
documents to whose interpretation they are committed."' 1' 9
The conception of constitutional interpretation advanced in this article is in sharp contrast with that advanced by Professor Perry, who
claims that no modern human rights decision rendered by the Supreme
Court plausibly can be understood as a constitutional decision. Perry's
claim, for example, that Roe v. Wade"20 was unauthorized by the Constitution and that it was not the outcome of a process fairly understood
as constitutional interpretation (as opposed to electorally unaccountable
policymaking)"'1 is not persuasive. 2' Although Roe may not have been
a "required" interpretation in the sense that it was not predetermined
by, or the only plausible interpretation of, the Constitution, it was not,
as a substantive matter, so totally devoid of support in the relevant
legal materials as to warrant the label of nonconstitutional policymaking. 22 I do not2 4 know whether Roe was, in a Dworkinian sense, the
"right answer"
to the question presented to the Court. I suspect it is

decisions, or purported objective readings of social morality. Of course, any approach to constitutional interpretation which resists the notion that results are not preordained is susceptible to such
abuse. But it is no less naive to believe that decisions without genuine support in the relevant legal
materials will be taken seriously by the interpretive community than it is to believe that naked
appeals to moral philosophy will be understood as constitutional decisionmaking. Cf 1. ELY, supra
note 113, at 58 ("('We like Rawls, you like Nozick. We win, 6-3. Statute invalidated.')"). Of
course, some nonfrivolous constitutional interpretations-even those deeply-rooted in philosophical
premises-may not, at least at the time they are offered, be taken (or offered) seriously either.
See, e.g., Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "'Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1166 (1977) (acknowledging that his interpretation of Usery "leads in directions the Justices do not seem to have intended or anticipated.");
Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to
.Essential Governmental Services, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1066 (1977)("I haven't a clue what
[the Justices really intended in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)], but I
doubt that the conclusion of this article was it."). But see United Transp. Union v. Long Island
R.R., 634 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 1349 (1982)(where the Court of Appeals
relied, in part, upon the Tribe-Michelman thesis).
219. Fish, supra note 173, at 562.
220. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
221. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 1; see also id. at 144-45.
222. Dean Ely made a similar claim with respect to Roe. See Ely. supra note 5, at 947
(Roe "is bad because it is bad constitutional law, or rather because it is not constitutional law and
gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be.") (emphasis in original).
223. See generally Heymann & Barzelay, supra note 150.
224. See R. DwORKIN, supra note 30. See also Dworkin, No Right Answer?, 53 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1 (1978).
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no more reasonable (or possible) to expect a consensus to form around
a single answer to Roe's question than would be the case for a single
interpretation of Hamlet. As is the case with most other modern
human rights decisions, Roe will continue to be evaluated and criticized from within and without the interpretive community which composes the American legal system. But I believe that Roe, like Brown v.
Board of Education and other prominent cases of the modern era, is
properly understood as a decision in the name of the Constitution. Its
legitimacy may be enhanced, but is not dependent upon, Professor
Perry's functional justification for judicial review.
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